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INTRODUCTION
While attention to the issue of incidental findings (IFs)
arising specifically in the context of biobanks and secondary
research is relatively new, it marks the convergence of two
more developed areas of inquiry—what to do with IFs arising
from biomedical research generally and what to do with
biological specimens and data containing DNA information
once they have been extracted from their human sources.1
When they first garnered attention, these two areas of inquiry
were largely the focus of bioethical questions:
• What benefits and harms, if any, do IFs pose for human
subjects?2

1. The term by which we should refer to the individuals from whom
specimens or DNA data are extracted and used for research has been debated
in the literature, including in the consensus report that serves as the center
for this Symposium. See Susan M. Wolf et al., Special Article, Managing
Incidental Findings and Research Results in Genomic Research Involving
Biobanks and Archived Data Sets, 14 GENETICS MED. 361, 364 (2012). As
explained by Wolf et al. and in Part I of this paper, these individuals do not
fall within the federal regulatory definition of “human subjects” if they cannot
be readily identified by the researchers using their specimens or data and if
their specimens or data were collected either for purposes other than the
research in question or by another institution that has stripped and retained
individually identifying information from the specimens or data. The issues
addressed in this paper and in the consensus report, however, involve both
individuals who meet this regulatory definition of “human subject” and those
who do not. The consensus report adopts the term “contributors” to refer to
individuals whose specimens or data are extracted and used for research
regardless of whether they also qualify as “human subjects” under federal
regulations. Id. We, however, choose here to use the term “human sources” as
we find that “contributors” implies a decision by these individuals to
contribute to research, whereas many of the issues for concern posed in this
paper pertain to situations in which the individual was given no opportunity
to make such a decision to contribute. Thus, the reader should bear in mind
that, for the purposes of this paper, “human subjects” are all “human sources”
but not all “human sources” are human subjects.”
2. In this paper, we use “human research subjects” to refer broadly to
individuals whose specimens and data are used in the course of research,
including human sources agreeing to participate in research and human
sources whose specimens and data are used in research without their
knowledge or consent. However, as explained in Part I, current guidance from
the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) advises that human
sources are human subjects but that researchers are not engaged in human
subjects research when the specimens and data used in research were not
collected for the purposes of that research and are not readily identifiable by
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•

What rights, if any, should human subjects have to be informed
of IFs?3
• What duties, if any, do researchers bear to inform human
subjects about IFs?
To
whom do specimens and data containing DNA information
•
belong once they have been extracted from their human sources?
• What rights, if any, do human sources of such specimens and
data have to decide when, by whom, and for what purpose their
DNA information can be used in research?
Indeed, earlier ethical and legal analysis of the issues
surrounding IFs put forth conclusions such as:
We argue that researchers owe research participants duties that
are both ethical and legal obligations: to disclose in the informed
consent process the possibility of discovering IFs and the plan for
management; to recognize an IF that arises during the course of
research; to verify the presence of the IF and evaluate its probable
importance, obtaining expert consultation if necessary; and to offer to
disclose an IF of likely clinical or reproductive importance to the
research participant.4
To treat someone as a mere means to gathering proteins or genes
or to observing the interaction between T-cells and virus is to treat
them as a mere means, period. What it takes, in this context, to treat
them also “as an end” thus becomes the question. If research
participants had full information about their condition and have
attained a full understanding of the nature and the risks of the
procedures involved in the research, securing their informed consent
to participation would probably suffice . . . . Research participants
generally lack this full understanding. Further, as the case of
incidental findings again shows, they enter studies lacking full
knowledge about their own medical conditions . . . . Given the lack of

the researchers. See OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE ON ENGAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONS IN
HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH (2008) [hereinafter GUIDANCE], available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/engage08.html. Similarly, OHRP provides that
human sources are not human subjects at all for the purposes of research
using biospecimens and data obtained from another institution and coded to
prevent researchers from accessing any individually identifiable information.
OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., GUIDANCE ON RESEARCH INVOLVING CODED PRIVATE INFORMATION OR
BIOLOGICAL SPECIMENS (2008); 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2011).
3. For our purposes, informing a human subject’s physician or health
care provider of the IF and allowing that health care provider with the
professional relationship with the human source to decide whether and how to
communicate the IF to the human source is the same as informing the human
source of the IF.
4. Susan M. Wolf, Jordan Paradise & Charlisse Caga-anan, The Law of
Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Establishing Researchers’
Duties, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 361, 362 (2008).
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full information and given the huge average asymmetry in knowledge
and understanding between the researchers on the one side and
research participants on the other, we should conclude that the
procedural safeguard of informed consent does not ensure that
research participants are treated “also as ends.”5
We reject this position [that investigators have no obligations] in
favor of the view that investigators do have limited obligations to
inform subjects of incidental health-related findings. There are at
least three potential sources for such obligations . . . . First, if the
investigator (or another on her research team) is a physician, these
obligations might derive from the nature of a physician’s professional
duties. Second, they might derive from duties rooted in general
beneficence, independent of any professional or other relationship
between the parties. Finally, and most persuasively, they might
derive from the nature of professional responsibility generally or
professional responsibility in the investigator-subject relationship.
Considering these possibilities, it turns out, sheds light not only on
investigators’ duties regarding incidental findings, but more
fundamentally on the nature of the investigator-subject relationship
itself.6

An interest in controlling the use of one’s DNA that is
grounded on human dignity need not adopt reductionist views
about personhood or the relationship between DNA and
identity. Particular uses of one’s DNA, in research or otherwise,
may be viewed as thwarting the will of moral agents where
such uses impede or undermine specific goals held by those
agents. For instance, individuals may oppose research on the
genetics of certain behavioral or other traits, like intelligence or
sexual orientation. Individuals might additionally believe that
DNA, including or especially human DNA, should not be
patented. In the absence of control over one’s genetic material,
however, researchers might well use an individual’s DNA to
conduct such experiments, or to isolate, copy, and patent an
interesting gene.7
Similar examples abound. Against this backdrop of
ethical and legal inquiry, genetic and genomic research has
continued to rapidly evolve from individual single-site studies

5. Henry S. Richardson, Incidental Findings and Ancillary-Care
Obligations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 256, 263 (2008).
6. Franklin G. Miller, Michelle M. Mello, & Steven Joffe, Incidental
Findings in Human Subjects Research: What Do Investigators Owe Research
Participants?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 271, 272 (2008).
7. Natalie Ram, Assigning Rights and Protecting Interests: Constructing
Ethical and Efficient Legal Rights in Human Tissue Research, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 119, 125–26 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
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into large-scale, high-yield, and, in a number of cases, highprofit enterprises.8 These enterprises are supported
increasingly by the rise of the so-called “biobank research
system” in which human specimens and data containing DNA
information are amassed from multiple primary collection sites,
including clinical (i.e., hospitals) and primary research sources,
and archived by large-scale biobanks for downstream use by
secondary researchers. In 1999, the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission (NBAC) reported that almost 300 million
human biological specimens were being stored in the United
States with over 20 million new specimens added annually.9
Research conducted on these stored specimens and on DNA
information derived from these specimens is often subject to
federal oversight regulations, including most prominently the
Department of Health and Human Services’ (DHHS) Common
Rule10 and similar Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulations11 governing conduct in human subjects research
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA)12 imposing data security standards and limiting the
research use and disclosure of certain types of health
information.13
8. See, e.g., Steve Silberman, The Flesh Files, WIRED, June 2010, at 159,
available at http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/05/ff_biobanks/all/1 (“From
drug development to assisted reproduction, progress in dozens of fields would
be impossible without biobanks. They are the biological back end of datadriven medicine.”). We also recognize that a number of academic or clinical
researchers are increasingly dependent on biobank research systems for
research grants, publications, tenure, and professional standing. See, e.g.,
Greg Blackman, Biobanking: Saving for the Future, SCI. COMPUTING WORLD,
Apr./May
2009,
available
at
http://www.scientificcomputing.com/features/feature.php?feature_id=232 (“[I]n a pharmaceutical or
biotechnology environment, biobanks are used to store specimen data in
support of clinical trials. . . . In a medical research institute, while the clinical
trial context may also apply, the primary focus of a biobank is to serve
Principle Investigators (PIs), which could be clinicians or PhD researchers.”).
9. 1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 13 (1999).
10. 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2011).
11. 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56 (2011).
12. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 5, 18, 28, 29,
42, 44, 45).
13. Other regulatory requirements may also be pertinent to biobank
research activities, including the Privacy Act. Regulatory requirements under
these regimes are, for the purposes of this paper, largely similar to those
raised under HIPAA and, thus, are not discussed in detail. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A
§ 552(a) (West, 2012).
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Under the Common Rule, researchers must typically
obtain approval from a local Institutional Review Board (IRB)
prior to commencing human subjects research.14 The IRB
approval must be based on a demonstration that the risks to
human subjects associated with the research are minimized
and are reasonable in relation to any anticipated benefits.15
The Common Rule also requires that researchers obtain
informed consent from human subjects for specific research
activities based on explicit disclosures of research risks and
benefits.16 HIPAA similarly requires authorization from
individuals before researchers can use or disclosure certain
health information in the course of research.17
However, existing federal provisions and exclusions to
these regulatory schemes allow researchers to avoid these
requirements
for
IRB
approval
and
informed
consent/authorization by using existing specimen and data and
recording information in a manner that prevents their human
sources from being identified18 or by using existing specimen
and data that have already been deidentified or stripped of
their individual identifiers.19 The primary basis for these
provisions and exclusions is that the only harms human
sources face as a result of research using their specimens and
data are those associated with privacy and the risk of
and
that
deidentification
effectively
identification,20
14. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2011).
15. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1)–(2) (2011).
16. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2011).
17. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1).
18. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2012); GUIDANCE, supra note 2.
19. See GUIDANCE, supra note 2. One can debate whether it is possible to
ever actually de-identify biospecimens as it is possible to match DNA
information extracted from a specimen to other available individually
identifying information. DNA matching is essentially 100% accurate and much
less likely to lead to errors as can happen with similar names or dates of birth.
The rise of biobanks storing DNA information makes it increasingly easy to
link that DNA information with DNA information extracted from
biospecimens for identification purposes. For purposes of this article, we do
not address whether DNA information can ever be truly de-identified.
20. See Greg Helgesson et al., Ethical Framework for Previously Collected
Biobank Samples, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 973, 973 (2007) (“Having a
biological sample stored in a biobank involves no direct physical risk to the
donor once the sample has been obtained.”); see also Human Subjects Research
Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing
Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,513–14 (July
26, 2011) [hereinafter ANPRM] (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164
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“minimize[s] the risk of harm to individuals while maximizing
benefit [from research] to the broader society.”21 Thus,
according to this view, deidentification avails the human source
of the same rights protected by the Common Rule and the IRB
process.22 Alternatively, these provisions and exclusions can be
viewed as allowing deidentification to eliminate the regulatory
obligations of researchers to individuals who would otherwise
be regarded as human subjects and afforded rights under the
regime
of
human
subjects
research
protection.23
Asaconsequence, some biobanks deliberately and permanently
de-identify specimens and data prior to sharing them with
downstream secondary researchers so that no obligations to
human sources may exist.24 The result is that secondary
researchers may not have any contact with the human sources
and may not know or be able to determine the sources’
identities. Furthermore, human sources may be completely
unaware that their specimens and data have been archived and
are being used for secondary research or any research at all.
Adding to this already complex picture is the potential for
secondary research to turn up IFs of potential clinical
significance to human sources. Questions loom as to what
duties biobanks and secondary researchers have to disclose
such IFs to human sources, and how such disclosures can even

and 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56) (“[I]ncreasing use of genetic information, existing
(i.e., stored) biospecimens, medical records, and administrative claims data in
research has changed the nature of the risks and benefits of research
participation. Risks related to these types of research are not physical but
informational (e.g., resulting from the unauthorized release of information
about subjects”).
21. Jill Pulley et al., Principles of Human Subjects Protections Applied in
an Opt-Out, De-identified Biobank, 3 CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 42, 45
(2010).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Katherine Drabiak-Syed, State Codification of Federal
Regulatory Ambiguities in Biobanking and Genetic Research, 30 J. LEGAL
MED. 299, 304 (2009) (“Currently, institutions may broadly collect specimens
that have no accompanying identifying information to use for anonymized
research without notification or obtaining a patient’s consent. Ambiguity in
federal law allows the possibility for institutions to build a biobank, by
collecting leftover specimens and coded annotated information outside the
scope of the Privacy Rule, to conduct genetic research without regulation or
oversight.”).
24. One such biobank is Vanderbilt University’s BioVU. See Pulley et al.,
supra note 21, at 45; BioVU: Vanderbilt’s DNA Databank, VANDERBILT UNIV.,
http://dbmi.mc.vanderbilt.edu/research/dnadatabank.html (last visited Apr.
20, 2012).

006 FATEHI HALL_PROOF - SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

582

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

7/5/2012 1:16 PM

[Vol. 13:2

take place when it may be difficult or impossible to reidentify
sources and when sources never consented to and are unaware
of their involvement in research in the first place.
If at this point the reader is thinking that this multiplex of
issues necessitates additional ethical and legal deliberation
about the rights of human sources and the duties of biobanks
and researchers, we have news for you—the issues are on the
table but may be in the throes of what we see as a type of broad
regulatory failure. We define this failure much like other forms
of non-market failure where government policies produce
ineffective results or distortions that undermine their very
purpose.25 We choose the term broad regulatory failure rather
than government failure because the problem we describe
involves not only formal oversight agencies such as DHHS and
FDA, but also institutional oversight bodies like IRBs as well
as complementary sources of oversight like standards of
practice adopted by biobank research entities including
primary collection sites (i.e., hospitals and primary
researchers), biobanks, and secondary researchers.26 As
explained by Natalie Ram:
For both researchers and society at large, simple and inexpensive
access to the raw materials of research is critical to promoting
investment in science and medicine. Researchers and those who fund
research have a strong interest in minimizing roadblocks to research.
Where there are fewer permissions to obtain, research can proceed
more quickly and with less cost . . . . The addition and protection of
more rigorous consent or other requirements designed to facilitate
provider control over the use, disclosure, and commercialization of
tissue may exacerbate these problems.27

Given the administrative burdens and delays to research
that can result from requirements for informed consent and
IRB review, biobank research entities have considerable
incentive to take advantage of favorable interpretations of
existing regulatory exclusions and exemptions provided under
the Common Rule and HIPAA by deidentifying specimens and
data and, thus, making reidentification of sources for the

25. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulation and Failure, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 11–23 (David Moss and John Cisternino eds.,
2009); Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less
Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARVARD L. REV. 547 (1979).
26. As discussed in more detail below, state law requirements have not
been addressed in prior analysis.
27. Ram, supra note 7, at 137–38.
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purposes of disclosing IFs a moot point. IRBs, which are
frequently cited as being chronically overextended,28 have
similar incentives to avoid advocating for disclosure of IFs from
secondary research as this would add considerably to the
number of protocols they would have to review and approve,
increase the complexity of questions they would have to
address in rendering such approvals, and place them in a
position where they would retain complex oversight
responsibilities for future secondary research.
In the summer of 2011, DHHS published an Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) to amend the
Common Rule in light of recent advances that have changed
the nature of biomedical research.29 As justification for these
proposed changes, DHHS cites the increasingly immense
volume of and expenditures for biomedical research30 and
argues that risks to human participants in research using
stored specimens and data are exclusively limited to
informational risks associated with unauthorized disclosure of
private information and do not include any physical,
psychological, or other types of risks.31 Thus, the ANPRM is not
only silent on the issue of IFs arising from biobank research,
but proposes amendments to the Common Rule that would
encourage broader and more irreversible deidentification
practices that, in essence, substantially reduce or eliminate (1)
any rights of human sources to receive IFs; (2) any researcher
obligations regarding return of IFs; (3) any researcher
obligations to obtain specific informed consent for research
using genetic information; and (4) any meaningful regulatory
oversight of secondary research using biospecimens and DNA
information obtained from biobanks.32
The good news for those concerned by this potential
regulatory failure—and, perhaps, the bad news for those
favoring status quo outcomes—is that federal law is not the
28. See, e.g., Lura Abbott and Christine Grady, A Systematic Review of the
Empirical Literature Evaluating IRBs: What We Know and What We Still
Need to Learn, 6 J. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH & HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS 3, 3
(2011); C. K. Gunsalus et al., Mission Creep in the IRB World, 321 SCIENCE
1441, 1441 (2006).
29. ANPRM, supra note 20, at 44,51a2.
30. Id. at 44,513
31. Id. at 44,513–14.
32. At the time of this paper, the final rule amending the Common Rule
has not been adopted. As such, we analyze the draft rule while recognizing
that there may be changes.
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supreme word dictating the outcome of complex biobank
research issues. Indeed, many complex legal and ethical issues
posed by biobank research, including issues of ownership of
specimens and data, retention and use of archived specimens
and data, genetic privacy, and informed consent, are already
being and will likely continue to be decided not by federal and
institutional authorities, but by state laws which to-date have
not been federally preempted.
This is not some idle possibility. A number of recent
judicial decisions reveal that researchers in full compliance
with federal regulations may be subject to liability under state
laws imposing higher informed consent and disclosure
requirements.33 Furthermore, because of the great variability of
requirements across different states, biobank research
activities that involve primary collection sites, secondary
researchers, and human sources from different states likely
face a formidable patchwork of laws under which they may face
liability, as well as jurisdictions in which they can be sued.
In this paper, we explore what we think is the likely
outcome for biobank research entities that choose to avoid
disclosures of IFs but which are in full compliance with federal
regulations. While disclosures of IFs are our central focus, we
direct significant attention to the issue of informed consent as
an unsettled and central element underpinning concerns with
all rights and responsibilities arising under the biobank
research system. In part I, we describe the enforcement and
limits of IF disclosures from biobanks and secondary research
under current and proposed federal regulatory requirements.
In part II, we further describe the broad regulatory failure
which may be taking place at the federal and institutional
levels. In part III, we describe how the enforcement and
limitations IF disclosures from biobanks and secondary
research might play out in state courts. Finally, in part IV, we
offer our points of consideration to biobanks, researchers, and
state, federal, and institutional oversight authorities concerned
with the eventual outcome of how rights and limits to IF
disclosures will be enforced.

33. See, e.g., Bearder v. State of Minnesota, 806 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 2011)
(holding that the Minnesota Department of Health violated Minnesota’s
Genetic Privacy Act).
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I. ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS AND LIMITS OF IF
DISCLOSURES UNDER CURRENT AND PROPOSED
FEDERAL REGULATIONS
The biobank research system is subject to federal human
subjects research regulations most prominently codified under
the DHHS Common Rule34 and similar FDA regulations for
human subjects protection,35 as well as to federal privacy
regulations under HIPAA.36 These regulations attach to specific
entities within the biobank research system, including
collection sites, biobanks themselves, and secondary
researchers, depending on the nature of the entities and the
activities they undertake. While these federal regulations, both
as they currently exist and under proposed changes put forth
by the ANPRM, are silent on the issue of IFs, they do provide
the framework by which we can assess when and how IF
disclosures could take place.
The Common Rule “applies to all research involving
human subjects conducted, supported or otherwise subject to
regulation” by fifteen federal departments and agencies,37 as
well as to research by any institution claiming Federalwide
Assurance (FWA) for the protection of human subjects by
adopting the standards and rules articulated in the Common
Rule.38 FDA regulations for human subjects protection apply to
all clinical investigations regulated by or in support of
applications for research and approvals for products regulated
by the FDA.39 Both the Common Rule and FDA rules for
human subjects protection typically require researchers to
obtain informed consent from human subjects and approval
from an IRB prior to commencing human subjects research.40

34. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2011).
35. 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56 (2011).
36. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat, 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
37. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2011); see also Federal Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/index.html (last visited
Apr. 26, 2012).
38. Federalwide Assurance (FWA) for the Protection of Human Subjects,
OF
HEALTH
AND
HUMAN
SERVICES,
DEP’T
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/assurances/assurances/filasurt.html (last updated
June 17, 2011).
39. 21 C.F.R. § 50.1 (2011).
40. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109, 46.116 (2011); 21 C.F.R. pt. 50, (a)–(B) (2011).
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Requirements for IRB review and approval under both the
Common Rule and FDA rules direct IRBs to evaluate ethical
concerns posed based on assessments of several key factors
including: minimization of risks to human subjects;
reasonability of risks in relation to anticipated benefits, if any;
adequacy of informed consent; sufficiency of data monitoring;
and protection of human subjects’ privacy and the
confidentiality of data.41 Informed consent is generally required
for the specific research being conducted and, absent unusual
situations, research participants can withdraw from the
research at any time, for any reason, and without penalty.42
While these regulations do not provide a concrete definition
of “risk,” guidance for IRBs has identified risks to subjects as
including physical, psychological, economic, and social risks.43
Concerns associated with subjects’ privacy and confidentiality
of data have been framed as a set of issues separate from these
other risks. These concerns pertain to subjects’ informed
consent to entrust investigators with access to their private
information and the associated responsibility of investigators to
safeguard that private information from unauthorized access.44
Stated differently, the federal regulatory system, including the
use of IRBs as an oversight mechanism, requires consideration
of, and protection of research subjects from, three core risks or
concerns: (1) unconsented research, (2) excessive or
inappropriate risk, and (3) disclosure of confidential
information (primarily health related information). The
satisfaction of one factor does not eliminate the need to satisfy
the other factors.
The extent to which IFs comprise risks of concern to IRBs
has been the topic of much debate. As explained by Wolf et al.:
For a research participant recruited as a normal control, discovery of
an IF suggesting pathology may trigger anxiety, burdens, and the
costs of further evaluation to verify or rule out a clinical problem.
Even research participants with known pathology risk discovery of an
unrelated IF, triggering the same. . .. [S]ome IFs will lead to

41. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2011); 21 C.F.R. § 56.111 (2011).
42. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (2011); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(8) (2011). There
are some complex withdrawal issues associated with implanted medical
devices that are not relevant to this discussion.
43. Institutional Review Board Guidebook, Chapter III: Basic IRB Review,
OF
HEALTH
AND
HUMAN
SERVICES,
DEP’T
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb_chapter3.htm#e1 (last updated 1993).
44. Id.
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diagnoses of clinical importance. . . For such a research participant,
taking part in the study imposes both the risk of discovering an IF
and potential benefit of discovering serious pathology in time to
intervene. 45

Proponents of including IFs as a category of risk to subjects
argue that minimizing risks and reasonably balancing risks
and benefits requires that investigators and IRBs evaluate
whether: (1) a research protocol has the potential to produce
IFs of clinical significance to subjects; (2) whether the protocol
provides adequate procedures for addressing when and how IFs
will be disclosed to subjects; and (3) whether informed consent
documents adequately inform subjects about the risks and
benefits of IFs, as well as whether and when they can expect IF
disclosures.46 Pursuant to this analysis, several commentators,
including groups such as the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission, National Institute of Health’s (NIH) National
Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention have put forth recommendations for
investigators and IRBs on how to identify and evaluate the
adequacy of plans to address IFs arising from research.47
Quite importantly, these recommendations have focused
almost exclusively on IFs arising in the course of primary
research in which IRB review and informed consent are de
facto requirements under both federal and state law.48
Secondary research adds further complexity to issues of IF
disclosure and informed consent given that the research being
performed may well not even be conceived of at the time that
consent is obtained. However, these analyses have not
generally been applied to biobank research entities including
collection sites, biobanks themselves, and secondary
researchers using archived specimens and DNA data from
biobanks for several reasons.
45. Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human
Subjects Research: Analysis and Recommendation, 36 J. LAW MED. ETHICS,
219, 227 (2008).
46. 1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 9, at 72.
47. Id.; Laura M. Beskow et al., Informed Consent for Population-Based
Research Involving Genetics, 286 JAMA 2315, 2320 (2001); Robert R. Fabsitz
et al., Ethical and Practical Guidelines for Reporting Genetic Research Results
to Study Participants: Updated Guidelines from a National Heart, Lung, and
Blood Institute Working Group, 3 CIRCULATION: CARDIOVASCULAR GENETICS
574
(2010),
available
at
http://circgenetics.ahajournals.org/
content/3/6/574.long; see Consensus Report, supra note 1, at Figure 5 for a full
roster of recommendations on returning IFs.
48. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109, 46.116 (2011).
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First, the Common Rule and FDA rules only apply to
instances of human subjects research.49 In the context of
primary research, the collection of specimens and data is
specifically for the purposes of the research in question and
involves direct contact with human subjects, easily bringing
collection activities under the gambit of requirements for
informed consent and IRB review. In the context of the biobank
research system, however, specimens and data may be initially
collected for non-research purposes, such as when physicians
obtain biological materials (e.g., blood or tissue samples) or
health information in the course of clinical diagnosis or
treatment.50 Neither the Common Rule nor the FDA rules
apply to such clinical collections at the time of collection. The
application of the Common Rule and similar FDA requirements
to the subsequent secondary use, including, for example,
situations in which the non-regulated collected specimens or
data are subsequently sent to a biobank or used for secondary
research, is unclear. Even if the initial collection of biobanked
specimens and data is research purposed (i.e., collected for
primary research), current federal regulations may not (and,
most often, do not) require primary researchers to obtain IRB
review or informed consent for any downstream secondary
research not yet conceived of that might use the collected
specimens or data.51 Those obligations, if they arise, will fall on
the secondary researcher once he develops his research
protocol. Furthermore, aggregation and archiving of specimens
and data are not in and of themselves considered to be research
activities under the Common Rule and FDA regulations.52
Consequently, under this view, biobanks do not need IRB
49. 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 50, 56 (2011).
UNIVERSITY,
50. See,
e.g.,
NUgene,
NORTHWESTERN
https://www.nugene.org/ (last updated Oct 5, 2010) (Northwestern University
NUgene biobank that “collects and stores genetic (DNA) samples along with
associated healthcare information from patients of Northwestern-affiliated
hospitals and clinics.”).
51. The applicability of the Common Rule and FDA requirements to
secondary research has been debated with differing views. While we may
conclude that certain of these federal requirements are applicable to secondary
research, that analysis is outside of the scope of this article. We instead focus
on state law requirements.
52. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OHRP - GUIDANCE ON
RESEARCH INVOLVING CODED PRIVATE INFORMATION OR BIOLOGICAL
SPECIMENS (2004) [herinafter OHRP GUIDANCE] (providing guidance as to
when use of human specimens is or is not considered research).
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approval or informed consent to engage in these activities.
Second, where biobanks and secondary researchers are
engaged in research, these research activities often are viewed
as falling outside the scope of the Common Rule or as
qualifying for categorical exemptions to Common Rule
requirements for IRB review and informed consent. The
Common Rule definition of human subject is “a living
individual about whom an investigator . . . conducting research
obtains (1) [d]ata through intervention or interaction with the
individual, or (2) [i]dentifiable private information.”53 The
Common Rule further clarifies that private information “must
be individually identifiable” such that “the identity of the
subject is or may readily be ascertained by the investigator or
associated with the information.”54 By contrast, the FDA rules
define a human subject as “an individual [either healthy or a
patient] who is or becomes a participant in research, either as a
recipient of the test article or as a control”55 without
consideration for direct interaction or identifiability of
information by the investigator. Thus, while the FDA rules do
not allow for waiver of IRB requirements based on the
identifiability of specimens and data,56 the (current) Common
Rule does include certain exclusions and exemptions that apply
to a large portion of biobank research activities.
Guidance from the Office of Human Research Protections
(OHRP) provides that research involving deidentified
specimens or data that were either not collected for the
purposes of the research in question57 or obtained from another
institute is not human subjects research at all and is excluded
altogether from the Common Rule’s jurisdiction.58 The Common
53. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2011).
54. Id.
55. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25 (2011).
56. FDA does, however, allow for waiver of informed consent
requirements in certain circumstances. CTR. FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL
HEALTH, GUIDANCE ON INFORMED CONSENT FOR IN VITRO DIAGNOSTIC DEVICE
STUDIES USING LEFTOVER HUMAN SPECIMENS THAT ARE NOT INDIVIDUALLY
IDENTIFIABLE (2006) (providing notice that the FDA “intends to exercise
enforcement discretion” when, inter alia, “[t]he study uses leftover specimens”;
“[t]he specimens are not individually identifiable”; “[t]he specimens are
provided to the investigator(s) without identifiers”; “[t]he individuals caring
for the patients are different from, and do not share information [with those]
conducting the investigation”; and “[t]he study has been reviewed by an IRB . .
. .”).
57. OHRP GUIDANCE, supra note 52.
58. Id.
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Rule itself also includes a categorical exemption from IRB
review and informed consent requirements for “[r]esearch
involving the collection or study of existing data . . .
pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if . . . the
information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner
that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through
identifiers linked to the subjects.”59 Consequently, biobanks
and secondary researchers can arguably avoid the Common
Rule-based IRB review and informed consent requirements by
either obtaining specimens or data that are already
deidentified or by separating such specimens and data from
their identifying information prior to commencing research.
Furthermore, even in some instances where secondary research
involves existing but identifiable specimens and data, federal,
Common Rule-based requirements for informed consent may
potentially be satisfied if the original collection site obtained
general consent for future research or if the original consent is
found to be compatible with the secondary research use.60
A third source of regulatory authority pertinent to the
biobank research system is HIPAA, which applies only to
“covered entities” including health care plans, health care
clearinghouses, and health care providers that transfer health
information in electronically.61 HIPAA restricts how covered
entities may use or disclose protected health information (PHI),
including information linked to biological samples62 that
59. 45 CFR 46.101(b)(4) (2011). A key note here is that, unlike the
excluded categories of non-human subjects research defined by OHRP, this
exempt category of research is subject to the final authority of DHHS and
agency heads for determining whether the requirements for the exemption are
in fact satisfied. 45 CFR 46.01(c) & (d) (2011).
60. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FAQS, TERMS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON INFORMED CONSENT AND RESEARCH USE OF
BIOSPECIMENS: THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH
PROTECTIONS
(2010), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp/
commsec/attachmentdfaq’stermsandrecommendations.pdf (“The determination
of whether a proposed secondary research use is compatible with the original
consent will be context-specific based on a range of considerations. If the
original consent form specifically prohibited the proposed research activity, it
is presumed the research is not allowable. If the consent does not prohibit the
proposed use, IRBs should consider several questions to determine
compatibility . . . .”).
61. 45 C.F.R. § 164.104(a) (2011).
62. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2011). HIPAA does not otherwise bind to
biological samples. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESEARCH
REPOSITORIES, DATABASES, AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 11 (2004),
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pertains to an individual’s current, past, or future health or
health care and is either individually identifiable or provides a
reasonable basis for individual re-identification.63
HIPAA may apply to a range of biobank research entities,
including clinical collection sites that provide health care at the
time of collection and electronically transmit PHI to biobanks,64
biobanks located at academic health centers or at hospitals,65
and secondary researchers receiving PHI from biobanks that
are covered entities.66 Because HIPAA defines PHI as
individually identifiable, it does not regulate covered entities
from using or disclosing deidentified health information as long
as an expert using “generally accepted statistical and scientific
principles and methods” can attest there is a “very small” risk
of re-identification, or if the health information is stripped of
eighteen specific identifiers provided under the regulation.67
Covered entities may retain the code linking deidentified
information to their identified source, but are prohibited under
HIPAA from using or disclosing the code.68 If the code is used
by a covered entity for re-identification, the information is
reinstated as PHI and the covered entity is again subject to
HIPAA requirements.69 In order to use or disclose PHI for
research, a covered entity must first obtain authorization from
the individual to whom the PHI is linked.70 This individual
available
at
http://privacyryleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/
research_repositories_final.pdf.
63. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2011).
64. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, RESEARCH REPOSITORIES,
DATABASES, AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supra note 62, at 1.
65. Id. (“Researchers are not themselves covered entities, unless they are
also health care providers and engage in any of the covered electronic
transactions. If, however, researchers are employees or other workforce
members of a covered entity (e.g., a covered hospital or health insurer), they
may have to comply with that entity’s HIPAA privacy policies and
procedures.”).
66. Id.
67. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b) (2011).
68. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(c). Under the Public Health Service Act, DHHS
also has authority to issue certificates of confidentiality to any investigator
conducting a study that requires IRB approval under the Common Rule when
the study involves the identifiable information. However, while HIPAA
prohibits covered entities from disclosing identifying information, certificates
of confidentiality only provide investigators the legal right to refuse disclosure.
They do not prohibit investigators from making voluntary disclosures. 42
U.S.C. § 241 (2006).
69. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (2011).
70. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1) (2011).
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authorization can be combined with informed consent required
under the Common Rule or FDA regulations71 and must
address the risk to the individual’s privacy posed by the
authorized use or disclosure.72
An important note is that HIPAA does not allow for
general authorizations for future use and disclosure and,
instead, always requires study-specific authorizations.73 As
with the Common Rule, HIPAA also contains certain provisions
that allow covered researchers to bypass its requirements.
First, HIPAA includes a provision that allows covered entities
to use or disclose identifiable PHI for research without
individual authorization through the obtainment of a waiver of
authorization from an IRB or institutional Privacy Board74
based on the satisfaction of three criteria: (1) the research poses
no more than minimal risk to the privacy of individuals, (2) the
research could not practicably be conducted without the waiver,
and (3) the research could not be practicably conducted without
using PHI.75 Covered researchers can also avoid the need for
individual authorizations by using a “limited data set”76 that
contains certain demographic information about individuals in
conjunction with a data use agreement that identifies
permitted uses and disclosures of that information77 and bars
the recipient of the limited-data set from identifying the
information or contacting the individuals to whom the

71. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(3)(i).
72. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PROTECTING PERSONAL
HEALTH INFORMATION IN RESEARCH: UNDERSTANDING THE HIPAA PRIVACY
RULE
11
(Apr.
14,
2003),
available
at
http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/HIPAA_Booklet_4-14-2003.pdf (“An
authorization differs from an informed consent in that an Authorization
focuses on privacy risks and states how, why, and to whom the PHI will be
used and/or disclosed for research. An informed consent, on the other hand,
provides research subjects with a description of the study, its anticipated risks
and/or benefits, and a description of how the confidentiality of records will be
protected, among other things.”).
73. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(3); see also DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., FAQS, TERMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON INFORMED CONSENT AND
RESEARCH USE OF BIOSPECIMENS: THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON
HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, supra note 60 (indicating DHHS’
interpretation of HIPAA as requiring study-specific authorizations.).
74. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(1) (2011).
75. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii).
76. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (2011).
77. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(4)(ii)(A) (2011).
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information pertains.78
The combined effect of these regulatory regimes is that
biobank research entities can arguably avoid most if not all
federal requirements for IRB review, informed consent, and
individual authorization by de-identifying their specimens and
data. The results with respect to IF disclosures are three-fold.
First, there may be no opportunity for an IRB to evaluate
whether the secondary research poses any risks or benefits
associated with IFs. Second, disclosures of IFs may be
impracticable or impossible depending on the extent to which
re-identification is technically possible or legally allowable.
Finally, even when disclosures of IFs remain a possibility, the
very act of considering them for disclosure or identifying their
sources may trigger an uncertain and complex web of
regulatory requirements that includes certain preconditions
(i.e., informed consent, IRB review, and individual
authorization) to research that the researchers did not and,
indeed, were not required to satisfy before they began doing the
research.
Proposed changes to this regulatory landscape as
articulated in the ANPRM address some of the challenges
raised by the biobank research system, but have an overall
effect that further frustrates disclosures of IFs. In contrast to
the claims stated above that IFs pose physical, psychological,
and economic risks and benefits to human subjects, the
ANPRM states that:
[I]ncreasing use of genetic information, existing (i.e., stored)
biospecimens, medical records, and administrative claims data in
research has changed the nature of the risks and benefits of research
participation. Risks related to these types of research are not physical
but informational (e.g., resulting from the unauthorized release of
information about subjects).79

As such, the ANPRM argues for several proposed changes
to current Common Rule requirements to address these
information risks. The first set of changes are definitional and
involve the adoption of HIPAA’s rigorous definitions for
identifiable information, deidentified information, and limiteddata sets in place of the Common Rules current, less stringent
definition for individually identifiable information. The
ANPRM provides that, under these more rigorous definitions,
“all research involving the primary collection of biospecimens
78. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(4)(ii)(C)(5).
79. ANPRM, supra note 20, at 44,513–14.

006 FATEHI HALL_PROOF - SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

594

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

7/5/2012 1:16 PM

[Vol. 13:2

as well as storage and secondary analysis of existing
biospecimens [would be categorized] as research involving
identifiable information.”80 This change stems from the
ANPRM’s position that “[r]egardless of what information is
removed, it is possible to extract DNA from a biospecimen itself
and potentially link it to otherwise available data to identify
individuals.”81
For researchers using deidentified information or limiteddata sets, the ANPRM argues that mandatory data security
standards, including provisions that “strictly [prohibit
researchers] from attempting to re-identify the subjects of the
information,”82 can provide better protection against
informational risks and, thus, should replace IRB review of
such concerns.83 Citing the increase reliance of investigators on
third-party experts to remove identifiers instead of recording
information in an un-identifiable manner themselves, the
ANPRM also argues that “data could be considered deidentified
or in a limited data set form even if investigators see the
identification but do not record them in the permanent
research file.”84
The second set of changes pertains to informed consent. As
stated by the ANPRM, under these revised rules “the allowable
current practice of telling the subjects, during the initial
research consent, that the data they are providing will be used
for one purpose, and then stripping identifiers, allowing it to be
used for a new purpose to which the subject never consented,
would not be allowed.”85 The ANPRM further provides that
these consent requirements can be satisfied in most cases at
the time of the initial collection of specimens/data by having
subjects sign a “brief general consent form allowing for broad,
future research” or allowing the subject to reject future
research. In instances requiring more specific consent, such as
cell line or reproductive research, this initial consent form
could provide check-boxes allowing subjects to opt in or out of

80.
81.
82.
83.
IFs.
84.
85.

Id. at 44,525.
Id.
Id. at 44,526.
Id. Note that this portion of the ANPRM did not address the return of
Id.
Id. at 44,519.
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these particular types of research.86
The proposed rules would require informed consent for all
biospecimens and identifiable data regardless of whether
originally collected for research or non-research purposes, but
allow for that consent to be acquired at the time of initial
collection. For research on limited data sets and deidentified
data, informed consent would be required unless the data was
originally collected for a non-research purpose. Perhaps
paradoxically, the approach proposed in the ANPRM provides
less protection for those individuals who have the least
knowledge that their biospecimens or health information will
be used in research. It would seem that this category of
“contributors” are entitled to at least some advance knowledge
and ability to consent (or to withhold consent) before research
is commenced using their specimens and information. Such
consent as is proposed by the ANPRM could also be obtained at
the time of the initial collection. The ANPRM states that these
informed consent requirements would only apply prospectively
to specimens/data collected after the adoption of the new rules.
The third set of changes pertains to the nature of IRB
review and the categories of research exempt from IRB review.
While the current Common Rule provides that “[r]esearch
involving the collection or study of existing data, documents,
records, pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, . . . if
the information is recorded by the investigator in a manner
that subjects cannot be identified” is exempt from all
requirements, these research studies would have to comply
with new mandatory federal data security standards under the
amended Common Rule. The ANPRM frames this change as
“moving away from the concept of exempt [research studies]” to
a category of research studies “excused” from IRB review. 87
Because this shift increases protections for subjects beyond
what is provided in the status quo, the ANPRM argues that the
“excused” category can be expanded to include more types of
studies than in the current “exempt” category.88
Thus, the ANPRM proposes that the current exemption for
research on pre-existing specimen/data be amended “to clarify
that the word ‘existing’ means collected for purposes other than
86. Note, however, that the ANPRM states that “[p]articipation in a
research study (such as a clinical trial) could not be conditioned on agreeing to
allow future open-ended research using a biospecimen.” Id. at 44,520.
87. Id. at 44,518.
88. Id.
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the proposed research and not that all the data or biospecimens
need exist that the time the study commenced.”89 Furthermore,
the ANPRM proposes that the current limitation on
investigators recording identifying information be eliminated
“unless there are plans to provide individual results back to the
subjects,” in which case the study would be ineligible for
excused status altogether.90
Research that does not qualify as excused under the
amended Common Rule would still require review by a fully
convened IRB. However, with the adoption of mandatory data
security standards, IRBs would only assess the ethical
dimensions of these research protocols, but would no longer be
responsible
for
assessing
their
information
risks.91
Furthermore, while the current Common Rule requires IRBs to
provide ongoing review of such research studies as a default,
the ANPRM proposes that “[w]here the remaining activities in
a study are limited to . . . data analysis (even if identifiers are
retained) . . . , the default would be that no continuing review
by an IRB would be required” unless the IRB decides that ongoing review is necessary.92
To facilitate tracking and auditing of excused studies,
researchers would be required to register these studies with an
IRB using a brief (one page) form.93 This form, the ANPRM
contends, would allow institutions to identify those rare
instances where an excused study might require expedited or
full IRB review.94
Overall, the federal regulatory system provides substantial
privacy protections for public disclosures of confidential
personal
health
information,
but
limited
research
subject/contributor/source protection. In particular, the federal
regulatory system provides limited informed consent
requirements, which are particularly noticeable in situations in

89. Id. at 44,519.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 44,516.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 44,520.
94. Id. (discussing how the implementation of the brief registration form
would allow researchers to begin their work after filing and certain filings that
did not meet the requirement for being “‘excused”‘ would be subjected to
“comprehensive administrative review,” which would prevent each filer from
having to go through this extensive process).
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which the biospecimen or information is collected outside of a
research context.95 The federal system also provides limited
guidance on when and how to return IFs to human sources.96
The role and responsibilities of secondary research is addressed
only in passing.97
This federal structure makes biobank based research more
economical and efficient for the researchers but may well not
address all of the ethical, medical, or legal rights or concerns of
the human sources.
II. REGULATORY FAILURE OF BIOBANK RESEARCH
OVERSIGHT
The issue of IF disclosures comprises only a subset of
rights and interests of human sources that are implicated by
biobank research. Indeed, the debate over IFs seems in many
respects to presuppose that federal regulations adequately
address many of the more fundamental issues raised by
biobank research that we believe are either inadequately
resolved or wholly unsettled as legal and ethical matters. These
issues include: the status of human sources of biological
samples and genetic information as human research subjects;
the rights of human sources to decide whether and how their
samples and information can be used by others with or without
consent; the duties owed to human sources by those who collect,
store, and conducting research on their samples and
information; and the effect of deidentification on these various
95. See id. at 44,523 (“Critics of the existing rules [for informed consent]
have observed that the current requirements for informed consent for future
research with pre-existing data and biospecimens are confusing and consume
substantial amounts of researchers’’ and IRBs’’ time and resources. Under the
Common Rule and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, if identifiers are removed,
specimens and data that have been collected for purposes other than the
proposed research can be used without any requirement for informed consent
or a HIPAA authorization.”).
96. See, e.g., id. at 44,520 (seeking advice on providing human research
subjects with more protection and asking “Currently some IRBs make
determinations regarding whether clinical results should be returned to study
participants. How should such determinations be made if the study now fits in
the Excused category? Can standard algorithms be developed for when test
results should be provided to participants and when they should not (e.g., if
they can be clinically interpreted, they must be given to the participants?”)).
97. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2012) (“Research, involving the collection
or study of existing data, documents, records, pathological specimens, or
diagnostic specimens, if these sources are publicly available or if the
information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that subjects
cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects.”).
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rights and duties.
It is our contention that these fundamental issues are not
only inadequately handled by the current federal regulatory
regime, but also that the observable practices of the biobank
research system that are currently allowable under some
interpretations of federal regulations as well as the recent
actions of the federal regulatory authorities, including the
ANPRM, are indicative of a potential regulatory failure in
which the very rights that are supposed to be protected by
federal regulations are instead being undermined. It is not our
intention to assign blame for this regulatory failure, but to
bring attention to what we see as a rapidly emerging
dissonance between the letter of the federal law and bioethical
concerns, state oversight of research, human source
expectations, and the spirit with which the federal oversight
system was initially created.
Federal human subjects research regulations were
developed in large part because of well documented failures of
researchers and oversight systems, both within the United
States and outside of the United States, to protect human
subjects.98 The rights of research subjects and the duties of
researchers were not as historically and widely addressed by
principles of common law as those that exist in the context of
the physician-patient relationship.99 The Twentieth Century
saw the rise of structured, complex human subject research
projects and the corresponding rise of the academic,
government, and private research industry.100 Much of this

98. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS IN RESEARCH FUNDED OR REGULATED BY U.S.
GOVERNMENT: HOW TODAY’S RULES PROHIBIT ETHICAL ABUSES IN HUMAN
SUBJECTS
RESEARCH
(2010),
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/
1946inoculationstudy/information_on_protection_of_human_subjects_in_resea
rch.pdf (detailing the history and development of federal human subjects
research protections); see also Donald H.J. Hermann, Lessons Taught By Miss
Evers’ Boys: The Inadequacy Of Benevolence And The Need For Legal
Protection Of Human Subjects In Medical Research, 15 J. L. & HEALTH
147,147 (2000) (summarizing the Tuskegee Syphilis Study).
99. See Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 363 (“Clinicians owe patients a duty of
care, which if breached, exposes clinicians to malpractice liability.
Researchers, on the other hand, have until very recently been held to owe
research participants few, if any, duties of clinical care enforceable in tort or
contract law.”) (footnotes omitted).
100. See generally Adam H. Laughton, Somewhere to Run, Somewhere to
Hide?: International Regulation of Human Subject Experimentation, 18 DUKE
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research was federally funded, federally directed, or federally
mandated.101 There was a parallel rise in the rights of patients
and human research subjects to control their care or
participation in research and their rights to information.
Federal regulatory systems were created to address research
conduct, particularly when conducted using federal funds.102
These federal regulatory systems did not, however, replace
other common law, statutory, or regulatory protections at the
state, federal, or international levels.103
As such, federal regulations governing human subjects
research can best be regarded as establishing the minimum
rights and duties arising from the research context. Research
subjects may well be afforded more protections under common
law principles of contracts and any additional rights they have
under state or common law. Indeed, the very language of the
Common Rule and similar FDA requires for informed consent
provides that:
No informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any
exculpatory language through which the [research] subject . . . is
made to waive any of the subject’s legal rights, or releases or appears
to release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution, or its agents
from liability for negligence.104

The legal rights referenced in the Common Rule include
rights to bring product liability suits and to assert medical
malpractice or privacy violations—many of which are state law
based.105
Similarly, the decentralization approach of using IRBs as
an additional oversight system to evaluate and approve
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 181, 181–91 (discussing the historical development of
human research and corresponding regulations).
101. See, e.g., id. at 185–87 (highlighting several controversial 20th
Century American research studies conducted with human subjects and the
U.S. government’s role in those studies).
102. See id. at 187 (“The revelation of the Tuskegee experiments resulted
in the passage of the National Research Act in 1974, which created the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research. In 1979, the Commission published the Belmont Report
which identified ‘basic ethical principles’ and applications of those principles
that were relevant to human subject research. The recommendations of the
Belmont Report were adopted by the Department of Health and Human
Services and many other federal agencies and incorporated into their
regulations. These recommendations evolved into what is currently known as
the ‘Common Rule’ for human research protection.”) (footnotes omitted).
103. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(e)–(g) (2011).
104. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2011); 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2011).
105. Id.
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research protocols on the basis of minimization and
reasonability of risk, adequacy of informed consent, protection
of privacy, and other standards set forth in the Common Rule
and similar FDA rules is designed to allow for additional
consideration of state and institutional requirements beyond
those established under federal law.106
The potential regulatory failure that we identify is one in
which these federal regulations are being approached as the
ceiling for rights and duties rather than as the floor.
Furthermore, through some process that we do not attempt to
diagnose, these federal regulations appear to be increasingly
moving in the direction of providing fewer and fewer
protections for research subjects, especially in the area of
research using genetic specimens and data. This is evidenced
both by the relaxation of informed consent and IRB review
requirements proposed in the recent ANPRM and by recent
draft guidance from OHRP and FDA on exculpatory language
in informed consent which states that:
[A] subject’s waiver of any rights he or she may have with respect to a
biospecimen obtained by investigators for research purposes would
not be exculpatory because it does not have the effect of freeing the
investigator, sponsor, institution, or others involved in the research
from malpractice, negligence, blame, fault, or guilt.107

While the explanatory discussion of this draft guidance
states that “[s]uch language may be considered an acceptable
way to accurately inform subjects that they will not be
receiving any financial compensation, now or in the future, for
the use of those biospecimens,”108 the examples of acceptable
informed consent language listed in the draft guidance go far
beyond waivers of financial interest and include “I voluntarily
and freely donate any and all blood, urine, and tissue samples
to the [name of research institution] and hereby relinquish all
property rights, title, and interest I may have in those
samples”109 and “[b]y consenting to participate in this research,
I give up any property rights I may have in bodily fluids or

106. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a)–(b) (2011); 21 C.F.R. § 56.109(a)–(b) (2011).
107. OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROT. & FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE ON EXCULPATORY LANGUAGE IN INFORMED CONSENT 2 (draft
guidance)
(2011),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM271036.pdf.
108. Id. at 2–3.
109. Id. at 3.
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tissue samples collected during this research.”110
The most significant concern with this situation—one
which, as far as we know, has not previously been identified—is
that the biobank research system, still nascent in most regards,
is looking to these waning protections as unilaterally
establishing the maximum or totality of the duties and
standards of care by which it can operate.111 This concern is no
better illustrated than with the issue of IFs arising from
research using biobanked specimens and data.
While the issue of IFs arising from the biobank research
system is fairly new, many commentators have discussed in
recent years the issue of what to do with IFs arising in the
course of primary research. In 2008, Wolf et al. provided a
comprehensive analysis of legal and ethical sources
establishing researchers’ duties to consider and manage IFs
arising in the course of their research. Looking at ethical
sources, the authors found support for such duties based on
notions of beneficence and reciprocity between researchers and
research participants,112 concern for participants’ welfare,113
and respect for participants’ autonomy.114 Looking at the source
of duties arising under federal regulations, the authors argue
that in order to satisfy their regulatory mandate to minimize
risks to human subjects and maintain reasonable balance

110. Id.
111. Drabiak-Syed raises a related point, stating:
Despite some prescriptive requirements [provided under the Common
Rule and HIPAA for the collection, storage, and research use of
biospecimens from biobanks], the federal law fails to adequately
protect individuals’ interest from unwanted collection and use of their
tissues for genetic research as a result of ambiguity and liming the
applicability of federal regulation to situations of direct identifiability.
Several state legislatures have magnified these loopholes in federal
regulation, codifying sweeping unregulated exceptions to promote
medical and scientific research advancement.
Drabiak-Syed, supra note 23, at 229.
112. Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 365 (“Relying on the ethical duty of
reciprocity suggests that researchers ‘incur obligations to help or benefit
[research participants] in part because [researchers] have received or will
receive assistance from [those participants]’”) (footnotes omitted).
113. Id. at 365–66 (citing arguments that research participants trust
researchers to observe abnormal findings of significance and that researchers’
discretion to share such information is key to participants’ well-beings given
the vulnerable position of participants).
114. Id. at 366 (“Respect for persons includes a respect for participants’
self-determination and consequent need for information relevant to their
health and well-being . . . .”).
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between risks and benefits, researchers and IRBs must address
how IFs will be handled.115 They state:
Whenever individuals participate in genetic, genomic, or imaging
research, they risk discovery of an IF. Finding out about an IF may
impose psychological burden, the financial burden of follow-up
assessment, and risk of bad sequelae from the follow-up tests. . . . Yet
there is also a risk that researchers will fail to notice an IF of high
clinical importance, and research participants will thus lose a chance
to avoid or ameliorate serious clinical consequences. . . . The
regulatory duty to minimize all of these risks suggests the obligation
to create a solid plan to address IFs in the course of research.116

Wolf et al. also argue that Common Rule requirements for
informed consent disclosures, including disclosures of
foreseeable benefits and risks and disclosures of findings
developed over the course of research that may affect
participants’ choice to continue their participation, all point
toward IRBs requiring that IFs be discussed in the informed
consent process.117 Finally, looking at sources of researchers’
duties arising under state common law, Wolf et al. find that
there may be sufficient basis to regard a failure to disclosure an
IF as a breach of the duty of care owed by a researcher to a
research subject.118 As previously mentioned, based on this and
other commentary, several organizations have produced
recommendations for the management of IFs arising in the
course of research.119
So why then, in light of all the compelling arguments and
support in favor of addressing IFs arising from primary
research as part of researchers’ ethical and legal duties, is the
disclosure of IFs from secondary research being disincentivized
by federal regulations? The answer may be found in the
following illustrative hypothetical offered by Ellen Wright
Clayton for how an IF disclosure from genetic research using
archived DNA might play out:
You were a patient at Hospital A several years ago when you were
suffering from disease X, which has long since resolved. You have just
arrived home from a long day’s work when the phone rings. When you

115. Id. at 367.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See generally id. at 369–73 (discussing cases in which “[r]esearch
subjects have . . . claimed that researchers have duties [of care] arising under
state common law doctrines grounded in tort, property, or contract.”)
(footnotes omitted).
119. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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answer, a soothing voice says, “I am a scientist at Research Institute
B two time zones away. I was examining your DNA and found a
variant associated with Disease Y that may be really important for
your health. Do you want to know about it?” If the scientist were
particularly thoughtful, she might ask, “Can you come here for
genetic counseling?” You wonder, What is DNA? How did she get
mine? What is a variant? What is Disease Y? What is genetic
counseling? Who is going to pay for me to go to Research Institution
B? Most importantly, you think, What choice do I have?120

According to Clayton, this scenario highlights the central
problems with disclosing IFs that arise from secondary
research: (1) that the archiving, sharing, and research use of
DNA is so pervasive and complex that the human sources from
whom DNA samples are taken may not understand when, how,
and for what end their DNA can be archived, shared, and
used;121 (2) that, because of this lack of understanding, sources
are often unaware that their samples are being used for
secondary research and may be caught off guard by disclosures
of IFs; and (3) that researchers may lack the knowledge to
adequately identify, interpret, and explain the significance of
IFs arising from their research. Given these problems, Clayton
argues that it may be appropriate to offer sources the
opportunity to give informed consent to IF disclosures but that,
absent such informed consent, “a general policy of offering
incidental findings to unsuspecting people who had not
previously thought about the issue just does not seem right.”122
We bear no cynicism toward this position that unexpected
disclosures of IFs can pose significant psychological harms to
unsuspecting sources and that informed consent for such
disclosures may very well be required by standards for ethical
research. The concern of biobanks and secondary researchers
for the welfare of their human sources is tested, however, by
four notable observations.
The first observation is paradigmatic in nature—while
researchers express concerns about the devastating
psychological harms that a source might face when
unexpectedly finding out that they may have a problem, they
120. Ellen Wright Clayton, Incidental Findings in Genetics Research Using
Archived DNA, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 286, 286 (2008).
121. This concern seems based on a view that the average patient is
incapable of understanding enough about genetic research to make any
informed choice either before the research is conducted or after the results are
available. This arguably paternalistic view was also the basis, discarded many
years ago, for not disclosing drug risks to patients.
122. Clayton, supra note 120, at 290–91.
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seldom discuss the devastating physical harms that a source
might face if they are not informed about a problem they could
avoid or mitigate had they been told of it. For whatever
reasons, the potential psychological risks of disclosure are
elevated over the medical, clinical, and physical risks posed by
non-disclosure.
While providing informed consent for disclosures could
help address this issue, the effectiveness of this approach is
curtailed by the second observation—in lieu of providing
informed consent for disclosures, some biobanks (including
BioVu, the biobank at Clayton’s own Vanderbilt University) are
opting to use methods such as irreversible deidentification to
make disclosure of IFs impossible in the first place.123 This
approach eliminates the psychological risks of potential
disclosure by also eliminating the benefits of disclosure of
medically critical IFs. In many ways, this is again an elevation
of psychological factors related to disclosure above the other
risks, benefits, and rights related to the disclosure of critical
clinical information, as well as rights to know and control how
one’s biomaterial is being used.
Third, a disclosure of an IF necessarily also requires
disclosure of the fact, subject, and scope of the secondary
research that gave rise to the IF. Such disclosure can expose
the researcher to criticism and objections. Some human sources
may well not want any undisclosed or unconsented research to
be conducted using their biospecimens or DNA data in the first
place.124 Other human sources may have ethical, religious, or
other personal objections to having their biospecimens or data
used in certain types of research.125 For example, some human
sources might object to the use of their biospecimens or data for
research into questions of any genetic basis for sexual

123. See generally Khaled El Emam, Methods for the De-Identification of
Electronic Health Records for Genomic Research, 3 GENOME MED. (2011),
available at http://genomemedicine.com/content/pdf/gm239.pdf (discussing
various de-identification methods in use) and highlighting, specifically, the deidentification process used by Vanderbilt University’s BioVU).
124. See R.M. Sade, Research on Stored Biological Samples is Still
Research, 162 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1439, 1440 (2002) (“There should
be no doubt about what is at stake in developing policy for the use of stored
samples: the fundamental right to decide whether and how one’s body and its
parts will be used in research.”).
125. See id. (discussing the broad range of reasons for which a person may
not want to participate in research studies).
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orientation or for the development of certain reproductive or
contraceptive technologies. Others may object to the use of
their biospecimens or data for research into ethnic or racial
differences in the safety or effectiveness of certain drugs or
medical therapies.126
Researchers may well wish to avoid facing such potential
controversy. Along the same lines, informing the human source
of the research may result in the human source explicitly
withdrawing consent or affirmatively requesting that he be
removed from the research, thus putting the research project
(and the researcher’s role in the research) at risk.127 In fact,
those who oppose study-specific informed consent often argue
that allowing human sources to withhold or withdraw consent
could affect the number of available samples on which to
conduct research or introduce some selection bias.128 And yet,
at the same time, these opponents to study-specific informed
consent also cite to studies that purportedly demonstrate that
most individuals do not have any objections to the unlimited
use of their biospecimens in future research without their
consent.129 This raises the poignant question: If most people

126. BiDil is the classic example of a drug with an ethnicity based FDA
approval. There are obvious social, cultural, and ethical issues with race or
ethnicity based products.
See generally Susan M. Reverby, “Special
Treatment”: BiDil, Tuskegee, And the Logic of Race, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
478 (2008) (discussing the issues surrounding BiDil through a raciallyorientated lens).
127. See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 850–51
(2001) (“There is always a potential substantial conflict of interest on the part
of researchers as between them and the human subjects used in their
research. If participants in the study withdraw from the research study prior
to its completion, then the results of the study could be rendered meaningless.
There is thus an inherent reason for not conveying information to subjects as
it arises, that might cause the subjects to leave the research project. That
conflict dictates a stronger reason for full and continuous disclosure.”).
128. See, e.g., Mats G. Hansson et al., Should Donors Be Allowed to Give
Broad Consent to Future Biobank Research?, 7 LANCET ONCOLOGY 266, 266–
67 (2006) (“Since the response for collection of data (eg [sic]. sending out
questionnaires or asking for renewed consent to use biobank samples obtained
previously) from any large population commonly ranges between 50% and
90%, the need for renewed consent for use of biobank material would reduce
the number of participants available, possibly introducing selection bias and
decreasing the scientific importance of the studies.”).
129. See Marshall B. Kapp, Ethical and Legal Issues in Research Involving
Human Subjects: Do You Want a Piece of Me?, 59 J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 335,
337 (2006) (“Other surveys demonstrate that most individuals who have had
tissue removed for other purposes have no objection to the unlimited use of
excess tissue in future research studies.”).
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have no problem consenting to such research, then why are
researchers so concerned that not enough people will consent?
Indeed, there appears to be some conflict between the interest
of the researcher to avoid having to explain and obtain consent
necessary to sustain their research projects and the rights of
human sources to know and consent to their involvement in
research. Eliminating any possibility of IF disclosures has, in
many respects, also helped to eliminate this conflict, as well as
the risk of controversy faced by biobanks and researchers. This
scenario is frighteningly similar to the very controversies that
gave rise to human subjects research protections in the first
place.130
Finally, the fourth observation requires reading the
subtext of Clayton’s final and most important question posed by
the hypothetical unsuspecting research participant: “What
choice do I have?”131 To start, while the question is posed in the
hypothetical as “what choice do I [the research subject] have
now that I know that something is wrong with me,” the
underlying questions seems to be “what legal rights do I [the
research subject] have now that I know I have been the subject
of research without my consent,” as well as “what legal or
ethical requirements do I [the researcher] have now that I have
found something clinically wrong with the human subject.” It is
this concern with potential legal liability that we believe may
be a driving factor for the solution proposed by some: set the
bar high for when disclosures can take place and permit
researchers to avoid any legal or ethical obligations by
immediately
and
permanently
destroying
identifying
information linking archived DNA to their human sources such
that subsequent disclosure of IFs becomes impossible.
In the next section, we discuss our own illustrative
hypothetical example—that which explores what we think is
likely to happen as biobanks and researchers continue to
operate without informed consent and continue to avoid
disclosures of IFs as permitted by federal regulations.

130. See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text.
131. Clayton, supra note 120.
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III. ENFORCEMENT AND LIMITS OF IF DISCLOSURES:
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN STATES GET INVOLVED
We begin with our own version of Clayton’s hypothetical
from Part II:132
You were a resident of the state of Red five years ago
when you checked into Hospital A in the state of Blue to
undergo routine surgery under the care of Dr. Physician for
disease X, which has long since resolved. Unbeknownst to you,
a tissue specimen taken from you in the course of your care at
Hospital A is sent to Biobank B in the state of Green for
archiving. Six months later, a researcher at Research Institute
C two time zones away in the state of Yellow obtains your
specimen from Biobank B and, in the course of research,
discovers a rare genetic variant associated with malignant
hyperthermia (MH), a potentially life-threatening condition
triggered by exposure to certain commonly used but easily
substitutable anesthetics. A year later, you move to the state of
Purple, where you undergo routine surgery and have a severe
reaction to the anesthesia, leaving you severely injured and
impaired. In seeking to gain a better understanding of MH and
how such a tragedy could befall you, you come across a research
article that discuss MH as an “incidental finding.” Curious
about what an incidental finding is, you delve a little deeper
and find the large body of literature on incidental findings
arising in the course of genetic research, including several
articles on how hospitals transfer their leftover specimens from
patients to biobanks for use in genetic research. You try to
remember if Dr. Physician or anyone at Hospital A ever talked
to you about what they were going to do with your leftover
specimen. You wonder, did Hospital A send my leftover
specimen to a biobank for research? Did they have any right to
do so without my permission? Is it possible that at some point
someone conducting research on my specimen discovered that I
was at risk of MH and didn’t tell me? Most importantly, you
wonder what are my choices?
You then discover, perhaps as part of a malpractice suit,
that your biosample has been transferred from institute to
institute and subjected to research that screened for MH—all
without your knowledge or consent. You are particularly
incensed when you discover that the secondary researchers did
find that you were at risk for MH and that no one told you or
132. See Clayton, supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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your physicians.
We believe that scenarios similar to this are not only likely
but inevitable especially as public concern for and media
coverage of issues such as genetic privacy continues to gain
momentum. The “aha” moment may come when an affected
individual makes a discovery in the literature such as that
described in the hypothetical above, or may come when a
researcher plagued with guilt over an incidental finding decides
to throw protocol to the wind and blow the proverbial whistle
by informing someone about a particularly important IF. It
may also come to the forefront as part of other litigation or
government enforcement action. Regardless of the specifics,
when such scenarios arise, the affected individuals are likely
seek legal counsel to assess what options for redress are
available to them. In this section, we will use the hypothetical
above to discuss the panoply of liability issues that such
scenarios will likely raise for biobank research entities. As we
proceed with our analysis, we ask the reader to bear in mind
that such scenarios will play out not once or twice, but with
multiplying frequency as news of early legal actions garner
attention from others in similar situations. Indeed, given the
scale of biobank research activities and the massive number of
individuals with specimens and data currently archived in
biobanks, we predict that early suits could quickly give rise to
class actions. For now, however, let’s continue our analysis of
the hypothetical at hand.
Let us assume that the injured party in our hypothetical,
who we will henceforth call Plaintiff, contacts an attorney
about his situation. The attorney begins his investigation by
looking at the informed consent provided to Plaintiff by Dr.
Physician and Hospital A and finds no disclosure or consent
pertaining to the research use of leftover specimens from
surgery. The attorney next inquires as to Hospital A’s practices
for disposing of leftover specimens from surgical procedures.
The attorney learns that Hospital A typically sends its leftover
specimens to biobanks. The attorney further learns that
Hospital A does not obtain informed consent from its patients
prior to making such specimen transfers to biobanks. From
this, the attorney forms his first question:
• Does Plaintiff have any cause of action against Dr. Physician or
Hospital A related to their failure to obtain his informed consent
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prior to transferring his leftover specimen to a biobank for
storage?
• Does Plaintiff have any cause of action against Dr. Physician or
Hospital A related to their transfer of his leftover specimen to a
biobank for storage?
The attorney then obtains copies of Hospital A’s material
transfer agreements and discovers that Plaintiff’s specimen
was sent to Biobank B. Filing more discovery, the attorney
obtains Biobank B’s material transfer agreement transferring
Plaintiff’s deidentified specimen to Research Institute C for
secondary research. The attorney also learns that Biobank B
retains the identifying code for all its archived specimens.
Here, the attorney forms his second and third questions:
• Does Plaintiff have any cause of action against Biobank B
related to Biobank B’s failure to obtain his informed consent
prior to transferring his specimen to Research Institute C?
• Does Plaintiff have any cause of action against Biobank B
related to Biobank B’s storage of his specimen for secondary
research?
Delving deeper into Research Institute C’s activities, the
attorney learns that Plaintiff’s specimen was used for a
research study on genetic markers for a particular type of
cancer under the leadership of Dr. Investigator. The attorney
further learns that the R1Y1, the genetic variant for MH, was
incidentally mapped in the course of this research study. Thus,
the attorney forms his fourth, fifth, and sixth questions:
• Does Plaintiff have any cause of action against Research
Institute C or Dr. Investigator related to their use of his specimen
for research?
• Does Plaintiff have any cause of action against Research
Institute C or Dr. Investigator related to their failure to obtain his
informed consent prior to commencing research on his
specimen?
• Does Plaintiff have any cause of action against Research
Institute C or Dr. Investigator related to their failure to inform
him of the incidental R1Y1 finding?
The attorney begins looking at the types of state laws that
might exist that could give rise to these potential causes of
action against Dr. Physician, Hospital A, Biobank B, Research
Institute C, and Dr. Investigator. Virtually all states have some
laws that affect the collection, storage, transfer, and use of
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human specimens, DNA data, and health information.133
Likewise, states often have laws regarding informed consent
and medical obligations.134 These laws may be contained in
states’ statutes and regulations governing human subjects
research, genetic privacy, health privacy, or medical records
handling and may include limits on the use (research and
otherwise) and disclosure of individuals’ medical information or
genetic data, requirements for informed consent for such uses
and disclosures, regulations governing genetic testing, and
restrictions on the purpose, duration, and methods of storage of
specimens and data.135 Furthermore, property, contract, and
tort laws, whether statutory or common law, may also impose
rights and limits arising from the use of human specimens and
DNA information. 136
In the following subsections, we discuss these different
types of laws and the possible causes of action that arise under
them in our hypothetical. It is important to note that the issue
of IF disclosures from secondary research involves a far broader
range of legal issues than just the responsibilities of secondary
researchers and just the rights of human sources of biological
specimens and DNA information. Indeed, this complex matter
implicates or involves a host of unsettled legal issues
pertaining to the responsibilities of all researchers and the
rights of all research subjects generally. Furthermore, because
the biobank research system involves the transfer of materials
and data from the human source to the primary collection site
to the biobank to the secondary researcher, we must be
concerned with the legal rights and responsibilities that exist
at each link in the chain and how they might be imputed to the
other links.

133. HAKIMIAN ET AL., 50-STATE SURVEY OF LAWS REGULATING THE
COLLECTION, STORAGE, AND USE OF HUMAN TISSUE SPECIMENS AND
ASSOCIATED DATA FOR RESEARCH, NAT’L INS. OF HEALTH, NAT’L CANCER
INST.,
http://www.cancerdiagnosis.nci.nih.gov/humanSpecimens/survey/

index.htm (last updated Mar. 5, 2010).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 369 (“Research subjects have also
claimed that researchers
have duties arising under state common law doctrines grounded in tort,
property, or contract.”) (footnotes omitted).

006 FATEHI HALL_PROOF - SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

7/5/2012 1:16 PM

2012] ENFORCING THE RIGHTS OF HUMAN SOURCES

611

A. MEDICAL AND HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY LAWS
Almost all states have laws regulating the privacy and
confidentiality of individuals’ medical and health information,
including in many cases restrictions on the allowable uses and
disclosures of such information by health care providers,
insurance companies, government health agencies, and others
with access to medical and health records and data. Some
states define medical information as including human tissue
specimens since these specimens and their associated DNA
data contain significant health and medical information as well
as information linking the identity of their human source.137
For example, California’s Confidentiality of Medical
Information Act defines “medical information” as “any
individually identifiable information, in electronic or physical
form, in possession of or derived from a provider of health care,
health care service plan, pharmaceutical company, or
contractor regarding a patient’s medical history, mental or
physical condition, or treatment.”138 A more direct example
comes from North Dakota’s Health Information Protection Act
which defines “protected health information” as:
[A]ny information, including genetic information, demographic
information, and fluid or tissue samples collected from an individual,
diagnostic and test results, whether oral or recorded in any form or
medium which:
a. Is created or received by a health care provider, health
researcher, health plan, health oversight authority, public health
authority, employer, health or life insurer, school or university;
and
b. (1) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental
health or condition of an individual, including individual cells
and their components; the provision of health care to an
individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the
provision of health care to an individual; and
(2)(a) Identifies an individual; or
(b) With respect to which there is a reasonable basis to
believe that the information can be used to identify an
individual.139

Some states’ health and medical information privacy laws
include provisions that allow for such information to be
disclosed either generally or specifically for the purposes of
research without the requirement to obtain individual informed

137. See Hakimian et al., supra note 133, at 4.
138. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.05(g) (West 2011).
139. N.D. CENT. CODE § 21-01.3-01 (2011).
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consent or authorization if the information is first
deidentified,140 if the researchers avoid identifying the
patient,141 or if the disclosure has been approved by an IRB or
some other designated authority.142 Other states require
patients’ authorization or informed consent prior to any
disclosures of protected health and medical information,
including for research purposes. For example, Vermont’s Bill of
Rights for Hospital Patients states that “[p]articipation by
patients in clinical training programs or in the gathering of
data for research purposes shall be voluntary. The patient has
the right to refuse to participate in such research projects.”143
Still many other states have statutes with no permitted
disclosures of medical information for research.144 Finally,
there may be common law rights relating to privacy, consent,
ownership of one’s biospecimens, fraud, or patient/physician
relations that are applicable to a specific situation.145
So how do these differing state law systems potentially
140. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.057(7)(a)(4) (2012) (permitting access
to medical records “[f]or statistical and scientific research, provided the
information is abstracted in such a way as to protect the identity of the patient
. . . .”).
141. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-37.3-4(b)(3) (West 2011) (“No
consent for release or transfer of confidential health care information shall be
required . . . [t]o qualified personnel for the purpose of conducting scientific
research . . . provided, that personnel shall not identify, directly or indirectly,
any individual patient in any report of that research . . . or otherwise disclose
patient identities in any manner . . . .”).
142. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-33a-109(3)–(4) (West 2011) permitting
the State’s Health Data Committee to approve requests for disclosures of
identifiable health information when the requesting party has received IRB
approval and when the request for disclosure of information is for “a specified
period” or “solely for bona fide research and statistical purposes as determined
in accordance with” the rules of the Utah Department of Health.) These rules
require “(i) the requesting entity to demonstrate to the department that the
data is required for the research and statistical purposes proposed by the
requesting entity; and (ii) the requesting entity [ ] enter into a written
agreement satisfactory to the department to protect the data in accordance
with this chapter or other applicable law.” A person granted access to
identifiable health data under these provisions “may not further disclose the
identifiable health data: (a) without prior approval of the department; and (b)
unless the identifiable health data is disclosed or identified by control number
only.”
143. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1852(a)(10) (West 2011).
144. Examples of states with statutes not allowing any disclosure of
medical information for research include Alabama, Idaho, and Illinois. See
Hakimian, supra note 133.
145. See infra Section III.C. for a discussion of these common law rights.

006 FATEHI HALL_PROOF - SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

7/5/2012 1:16 PM

2012] ENFORCING THE RIGHTS OF HUMAN SOURCES

613

impact our hypothetical? The answer, as described more fully
below, is that there is any number of potential interfaces with
different state laws. These will not always be consistent as
state statutory and common laws can vary.
In our hypothetical, Plaintiff can potentially recover from
Hospital A for violating health and medical information privacy
laws if he can bring suit in a state that recognizes tissue
specimens or DNA information as protected medical
information and either bars disclosure of medical information
without authorization or imposes relevant restrictions on when
and for what purposes medical information can be disclosed.146
It is important to note that the types of restrictions that are
relevant here are very broad because Hospital A transferred
Plaintiff’s specimen to a biobank for archiving and storage and
not to a researcher for the purposes of research. Consequently,
even if the applicable state statute permits disclosures of
medical information without informed consent or authorization
for the purposes of research, Hospital A has acted outside the
scope of such permissible disclosures because it sent the
specimen to a biobank that does not itself conduct research.
This argument is especially viable in states that impose time
limits on disclosures of medical and health information.
Additionally, even if the state in which Plaintiff brings suit
does not recognize tissue specimens as medical and health
information, Plaintiff could potentially argue that access to
such specimens falls within the scope and intent of medical and
health information privacy laws given the massive amount of
personally identifiable health and medical data that can be
extracted from such tissues. Finally, Hospital A may be
responsible for ensuring that whatever rights Plaintiff has are
assigned or transferred to the subsequent holders of the
biospecimens and subsequent researchers.
Plaintiff can also potentially recover from Biobank B,
depending on the law of the state in which he brings suit, on
the grounds of unauthorized use of protected health and
medical information for the biobank’s storage and archiving of
the specimen, as well as on the grounds of unauthorized
146. For example, a recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision, Bearder v.
State, held that biospecimens collected from newborn infants for the state’s
newborn bloodspot screening program could not be used for any testing or
research purposes beyond the specific purposes set forth in the enabling
statute unless express consent was obtained for the additional research.
Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 2011).
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disclosure of protected health and medical information for the
biobank’s transfer of the specimen Research Institute C.
Similarly, Plaintiff could potentially recover from Research
Institute C and Dr. Investigator for unauthorized use of
protected health and medical information if he brings suit in a
state that does not permit research use of such information,
even when it is deidentified, without informed consent.
There is also then the final question of whether state law
requirements on the transfer of medical and health information
can be interpreted as also requiring that any other obligations
arising under other state statutes or common law for the use or
disclosure of that medical and health information (such as an
obligation to disclosure IFs) be transferred with the medical
and health information. A similar theory would impose liability
on the various links in the chain by which the biospecimen
traveled from its initial collection to the ultimate secondary
researcher. Put otherwise: did Research Institute C or Dr.
Investigator have any obligation to inform (or at least attempt
to inform) the original human source of the IF by virtue of
someone lower in chain by which the biospecimen traveled
having such an obligation?
Under general state law concepts discussed in more detail
in Section C, there may be some duties arising from the
researcher-research subject’s relationship that require
informed consent and/or disclosures of IFs to inform the
human source of the biospecimen. This duty can potentially be
found in a number of sources. First, such a duty is postulated
by the various commentators who assert that there is some,
perhaps limited, duty to inform human sources of IFs,
particularly if, as is the case in this hypothetical, the IFs are
material and actionable. 147 If such duties exist, then each link
in the chain by which the biospecimen is transferred may be
obliged to also assume those duties. In other words, one may
have an obligation to transfer the biospecimen in a manner
that transfers any such duties to the next entity. one may not
and should not be able to avoid a duty to obtain informed
consent or warn of an IF by transferring the material that is
the subject of those duties without ensuring that the duties also

147. See generally Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 366–73 (discussing different
sources of researchers’ duties ““to offer findings of likely clinical or
reproductive significance to research participants.”).
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transfers.148 Finally, there may be a connection between
unauthorized research and a subsequent obligation to both
inform the subject of the unauthorized research and the results
of that research.
B. GENETIC TESTING AND GENETIC INFORMATION LAWS
In addition to health and medical information privacy
laws, almost all states also have laws on the acquisition, use,
disclosure, and collection and storage of genetic materials and
information.149 These laws may govern genetic materials and
information themselves or may impose requirements and
restrictions on the act of genetic testing. Definitions of genetic
testing, materials, and information vary significantly across
states and may be found in laws with different intents and
purposes including regulations of genetic testing conduct;
permissible use of genetic testing, materials, and information;
limits on storage (including permissible duration) and transfer
of genetic materials and information; confidentiality of records
containing genetic information; and informed consent
requirements for conducting genetic tests, disclosing or access
genetic materials and information, and performing research on
genetic materials and information.
Genetic testing, materials, and information subject to these
various laws arise under a number of situations, including for
the purposes medical diagnosis in the clinical context, for
research purposes, and for government programs such as
newborn bloodspot screening. Many states’ laws define genetic
testing, materials, and information and distinguish
requirements for genetic testing and for the use, storage, and
disclosure of genetic materials and information on the basis of
these different contexts. Some states’ laws include broad
exclusions for genetic testing and information used in the
research context. One particularly broad example is
Massachusetts’ laws governing genetic information privacy and

148. This can be analogized to property law concepts by which obligations
(such as encumbrances, mortgages or easements) linked to property are
transferred with the property or to commercial law concepts requiring the
transfer of liens or other encumbrances to successors.
149. See, e.g., Drabiak-Syed, supra note 23 at 304–05 (“[S]everal states
have passed statutes governing collection of specimens and individual
information for research purposes. Approximately two-thirds of the states
have supplemented the federal regulation and enacted provisions specifically
related to an individual’s genetic information.”) (footnotes omitted).
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informed consent for genetic testing which defines “genetic
information” as “any written or recorded individually
identifiable result of a genetic test,” but provides that:
[G]enetic information shall not include any information about an
identifiable person that is taken:
(1) as a biopsy, autopsy, or clinical specimen solely for the
purpose of conducting an immediate clinical or diagnostic test
that is not a test of DNA, RNA, mitochondrial DNA,
chromosomes or proteins;
(2) as a blood sample solely for blood banking;
(3) as a newborn screening pursuant to section 110A; [or]
(4) as confidential research information for use in epidemiological
and clinical research conducted for the purpose of generating
scientific knowledge about genes or learning about genes or
learning about the genetic basis of disease or for developing
pharmaceutical and other treatments of disease . . . .150

Other states’ laws exclude genetic tests and information in
the clinical context. For example, South Dakota’s laws
requiring informed consent for medical research involving
genetic testing and genetic information exclude genetic tests
and their derivative information obtained in the clinical context
by defining a “genetic test” as:
[A] test of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, or genes performed in
order to identify the presence or absence of an inherited variation,
alteration, or mutation which is associated with predisposition to
disease, illness, impairment, or other disorder. Genetic test does not
mean a routine physical measurement; a chemical, blood, or urine
analysis; a test for drugs or HIV infection; any test commonly
accepted in clinical practice; or any test performed due to the
presence of signs, symptoms, or other manifestations of a disease,
illness, impairment, or other disorder.151

Some states use definitions that include no exclusions,
research or otherwise. For instance, Oregon’s genetic privacy
and research laws define “genetic test” as “a test for
determining the presence or absence of genetic characteristics
in an individual or the individual’s blood relatives, including
tests of nucleic acids such as DNA, RNA and mitochondrial
DNA, chromosomes or proteins in order to diagnose or
determine a genetic characteristic.”152
Still, another important definitional difference across
states is whether the definition of “genetic information”
150. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70G(a)(1)–(4) (West 2011).
151. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-14-21(2) (2011).
152. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192.531(14) (West 2011).
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includes or is distinguished from biological materials such as
tissue samples from which genetic information can be
extracted. Looking again to Oregon’s genetic privacy and
research laws for an example, a “DNA sample” is defined as
“any human biological specimen that is obtained or retained for
the purpose of extracting and analyzing DNA to perform a
genetic test [and] includes DNA extracted from the
specimen”153 while “genetic information” is defined as
“information about an individual or the individual’s blood
relatives obtained from a genetic test.154
‘This distinction is significant in a state such as Oklahoma
which allows deidentified genetic information to be used for
research without informed consent, but requires informed
consent for research on “[a]ll stored tissues, including blood,
that arise from surgery [or] other diagnostic or therapeutic
steps.”155
One of the most rigorous regulatory regimes is that of New
York, which governs confidentiality of genetic information
under its civil rights laws and provides that biological samples
may be used for research purposes without specific informed
consent if the research is IRB approved and if the individual
who is the source of the sample provided:
[P]rior written informed consent for the use of their sample for
general research purposes and did not specify time limits or other
factors that would restrict use of the sample for the test, and (1) the
samples have been permanently stripped of identifying information;
or (2) a coding system has been established to protect the identity of
the individuals who provided the samples, and an institutional review
board has reviewed and approved the procedures for the coding
system.156

The requirements for this prior written informed consent
to research are extensive and include:
(1) a statement that the sample will be used for future genetic tests;
(2) the time period during which the tissue will be stored, or if no time
limit is specified, a statement that the tissue will be stored for as long
as deemed useful for research purposes;
(3) a description of the policies and procedures to protect patient
confidentiality;
(4) a statement of the right to withdraw consent to use of the tissue
for future use at any time and the name of the organization that

153.
154.
155.
156.

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192.531(9).
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192.531(11).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 3614.4(E) (West 2011).
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-1(9)(a) (McKinney 2011).
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should be contacted to withdraw consent;
(5) a statement allowing individuals to consent to future contact for
any or all purposes, including the following: (i) research purposes; (ii)
provision of general information about research findings; and (iii)
information about the test on their sample that may benefit them or
their family members in relation to their choices regarding preventive
or clinical care; and
(6) a statement explaining the benefits and risks of consenting to
future contact for the purposes set forth in subparagraph five of this
paragraph. In no event shall information about specific test results on
stored human tissue donated for general research purposes be
disclosed to an individual without obtaining informed consent for the
disclosure as [set out earlier in the law].157

Given the diversity of the laws, we will not dwell in detail
on the range of causes of action Plaintiff may have against Dr.
Physician, Hospital A, Biobank, Research Institute C, and Dr.
Investigator, other than to point out that, depending on the
state(s) in which he bring suits, Plaintiff may have multiple
claims against each potential defendant and the strength or
elements of any such claim may well vary from state to state.
A more important point for us to raise here is that there
have recently been several important state judicial decisions
pertaining to the unauthorized research use of biological
materials obtained for other purposes, and that the courts
rendering these decisions have interpreted statutory definitions
and protections rather favorably toward the human
source/plaintiff. The most recent of these cases, Bearder v.
State of Minnesota, was decided by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in November, 2011 and involved as plaintiffs nine
families and twenty-five children claiming violations of the
state’s Genetic Privacy Act. In Bearder, the Minnesota
Department of Health conducted its own research and allowed
outside research organizations to conduct research using
leftover blood samples from its newborn screening program
without first obtaining written informed consent from the
individual sources of the blood samples as required under the
Genetic Privacy Act.158 The relevant portion of the Genetic
Privacy Act provides that:
Unless otherwise expressly provided by law, genetic information
about an individual:
(1) may be collected by a government entity . . . or any other

157. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-1(9)(e)(1)–(6).
158. See generally Bearder v. State, 866 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 2011).
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person only with the written informed consent of the individual;
(2) may be used only for purposes to which the individual has
given written informed consent;
(3) may be stored only for a period of time to which the individual
has given written informed consent; and
(4) may be disseminated only:
(i) with the individual’s written informed consent; or
(ii) if necessary to accomplish purposes described by clause
(2). A consent to disseminate genetic information under (i)
must be signed and dated. Unless otherwise provided by law,
such a consent is valid for one year or for a lesser period
specified in the consent.159

The first issue before the court was whether blood samples
qualified as “genetic information” requiring informed consent
under the Genetic Privacy Act which provides the following two
definitions for “genetic information”:
(a) “Genetic information” means information about an identifiable
individual derived from the presence, absence, alteration, or mutation
of a gene, or the presence or absence of a specific DNA or RNA
marker, which has been obtained from an analysis of:
(1) the individual’s biological information or specimen; or
(2) . . .
(b) “Genetic information” also means medical or biological information
collected from an individual about a particular genetic condition that
is or might be used to provide medical care to that individual or the
individual’s family members.160

The plaintiffs argued that blood samples qualify as genetic
information because they contain DNA information.161 The
defendants argued that blood samples are biological specimens
and not genetic information.162 The court held that blood
samples could not be genetic information under definition (a),
as that definition applies to the information resulting from
genetic testing and not to the specimen that provides that
source for that information.163 However, the court ruled that
definition (b) “is broader in scope because it encompasses
‘medical or biological information’ about an individual. . . [and]
biological information includes blood samples.”164 The court
further concluded:
[E]ven if the Genetic Privacy Act did not define the blood samples

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 771 (citing MINN. STAT. § 13.386(3)).
Id. at 772 (citing MINN. STAT. § 13.386(1)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 773.
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themselves as “genetic information,” those samples unquestionably
contain genetic information. The Act limits the collection, use,
storage, or dissemination of genetic information. It would be
impossible to collect, use, store, or disseminate those samples without
also collecting, using, storing, or disseminating the genetic
information contained in those samples.165

The court then addressed whether the state’s mandatory
newborn screening law provided the defendants with an
“expressly provided” exemption from the requirements of the
Genetic Privacy Act.166 The court concluded that the newborn
screening law provided the defendants with an exemption only
to the extent that the blood samples were used for the purposes
of newborn screening.167 The court held that the defendants
violated the Genetic Privacy Act’s restrictions on use (by using
the blood samples for its own research), storage (my retaining
the blood samples longer than the forty-five days allowed under
the newborn screening law), and dissemination (by allowing
outside researchers to use the blood samples).168
One of the most significant aspects of the Bearder decision
is that it did not rely on any elements or principles of the
federal regulatory oversight system. Rather, it was argued and
decided purely on the grounds of state law and is an example of
how state law, and not federal law, can be the principal basis
for determining the rights and responsibilities of human
sources and researchers.
C. CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER STATE COMMON LAW
We address issues of tort, contact, and property law jointly
in this section as each area provides its own considerations but
fundamentally interacts with the others. Indeed, statutory and
case law pertaining to rights and obligations that arise in the
context of research on human biological specimens and genetic
information typically involves complex commingling of all three
of these areas of law. At the heart of these tort, contract, and
property law issues is the matter of informed consent. It is
claims of inadequate informed consent or breach of the
informed consent agreement that typically provide the basis for
plaintiffs’ tort actions alleging the breach of duty and

165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 774.
Id. at 774–76.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 774–76.
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negligence of physicians and researchers, as well as breach of
contract and property right actions alleging unauthorized use,
disclosure, and transfer of biological materials and genetic
information by researchers. Thus, it is the informed consent
agreement to which courts typically look to determine the
assignment of rights and duties in such disputes. It is
important to note, as previously mentioned, that federal
regulations governing informed consent prohibit the use of
exculpatory language that results in a research subject waiving
any of his legal rights or releasing a researcher or research
institution from liability for negligence.169 While less common,
there can also be state law based liability under tort, contract,
or property law for the failure of researchers or biobanks to
satisfy the terms and conditions set forth in the informed
consent document or otherwise established by state law.
As is the case with state statutory law, causes of action
arising under state common law involve a range of unsettled
legal issues pertaining not only to the disclosure of IFs but also
to the responsibilities of researchers and the rights of all
research subjects, including human sources of biological
materials and DNA information, generally.
i. Tort Law
Tort liability in negligence depends on the existence of a
duty of care owed by one party to another. To be successful, a
negligence claim must demonstrate: (1) that the defendant
owed the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) that this duty of care of
was breached, (3) that the plaintiff suffered some injury as a
result of that breach, and (4) that the defendant’s failure to
satisfy the duty of care was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s injury.170 The standard by which a duty of care is
measured depends significantly on the circumstances of the
relationship between the two parties. In most instances, courts
will apply a standard of reasonable care under the
circumstances and test the defendant’s alleged breach against
the actions of a reasonable person in the same situation.171
However, some relationships, such as the physician-patient
relationship, are recognized as requiring a higher standard.

169. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2011); 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2011).
170. 57A AM. JUR. 2D NEGLIGENCE § 71 (2012).
171. STEVEN E. PEGALIS, 1 AM. LAW. MED. MALP., STANDARD OF CARE,
GENERALLY § 3:3 (2011).
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Physicians owe patients a standard care that is reasonable not
for average person but for their medical profession.172
Physicians also have a duty to inform patients of any
foreseeable risks, as well as of any interests of the physician
that may present a conflict or affect the patient’s decisions to
undergo a particular treatment.173 This is often viewed as a
fiduciary obligation that the physician owes the patient. If a
patient can prove that he suffered an injury, including the
decision to not undergo treatment, due to a physician’s failure
to disclose a foreseeable risk or conflicting interest, the
physician can be held negligent under medical malpractice
regardless of any benefits that resulted for the patient. As such,
the adequacy of informed consent disclosures and procedures is
paramount to the satisfaction of a physician’s duty of care.
In 2008, Wolf et al. conducted a comprehensive analysis of
the duty of care owed by researchers to research participants.174
The authors report that where a duty of care under a
physician-patient relationship already exists, a court may
extend that duty of care to include research activities
undertaken by the physician.175 For instance, the court in
Moore v. Regents of the University of California held that a
patient-plaintiff is permitted to bring an action for breach of
fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent related to his
physician’s failure to disclosure his financial interest in
removing the patient’s spleen and biological specimens for nontherapeutic research use to develop a cell line.176 Thus, Plaintiff
in our hypothetical case may be able to assert a negligence
claim against Dr. Physician and Hospital A based on Dr.
Physician’s breach of informed consent for failing to disclose to
Plaintiff that his leftover specimen would be sent to a biobank
for storage and future downstream research. Furthermore, the
Plaintiff may be able to assert that Dr. Physician and Hospital
A failed to disclose the potential benefit they would receive
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 361–62.
175. Id. at 369.
176. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990)
(holding that “(1) a physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to the
patient’s health, whether research or economic, that may affect the physician’s
professional judgment; and (2) a physician’s failure to disclose such interests
may give rise to a cause of action for performing medical procedures without
informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty.”).
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(whether financial, professional, or reputational) from storing
or using the biospecimen or from transferring the biospecimen
for storage or use by others. Plaintiff might argue that he
would not have agreed to the surgery had he known about how
his leftover specimen would be used, would have consented to
the use of his biospecimens only if certain returns of IFs were
agreed upon, or would have refused to consent to any storage or
use of biospecimens for any or particular uses or timeframes
beyond those needed for immediate treatment. Plaintiff may
also use the breach of the duty to support a property- or
contract-based injury as discussed in subsequent sections of
this paper.
It is important to note, as Wolf et al. point out, that the
Moore court dealt only with the existing physician-patient
relationship and did not address the duties of the defendant as
a researcher to the plaintiff as a research subject, nor did it
address the issue of human subjects research without informed
consent.177 As such, the holding in the Moore case does not fully
identify the duties of care, if any, owed to our hypothetical
Plaintiff by Biobank B, Research Institute C, or Dr.
Investigator or what actions (or failures to act) may amount to
a breach of those duties. In the absence of a physician-patient
relationship, courts typically apply a standard duty of
reasonable
care
to
the
researcher-research
subject
relationship.178 Several recent cases, however, suggest that
courts may be willing to recognize the existence of some special
relationship between researchers and research subjects that is
deserving of a higher duty of care, especially as pertains to
informed consent, though the nature of this special relationship
is not yet certain. In the case of Greenberg v. Miami Children’s
Hospital, the district court stated that “since the law regarding
a duty of informed consent for research subjects is unsettled
and fact-specific . . . , the Court finds that in certain
circumstances a medical researcher does have a duty of
informed consent,” but declined to further elucidate as to when
and how such a duty attaches.179 In finding for the defendant,
the district court identified as a factor the distinction that the
177. Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 369.
178. Id. (citing E. Haavi Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and
Malpractice Tort Doctrines: Courts On A Learning Curve, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH
L. & POL’Y 1, 28–29 (2003)).
179. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1070 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
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plaintiffs in Greenberg, who knowingly donated biological
specimens to a particular researcher for research on a
particular disease, were “more accurately portrayed as donors
rather than objects of human experimentation, and thus the
voluntary nature of their submissions warrant[ed] different
treatment.”180 This suggests that the court might have attached
a higher duty of informed consent to the research had the
biological specimens not been obtained voluntarily from the
donors explicitly for research, as is the case with our
hypothetical Plaintiff, Research Institute C, and Dr.
Investigator.
This case also opens the door to consider hybrid situations,
such as the case of our hypothetical, in which the biospecimen
was obtained as part of the ordinary provision of medical care
and not as part of any disclosed research program. One can
certainly argue that the initial relationship pursuant to which
the biospecimen was obtained controls all subsequent storage
or research use. Under such an approach, a later informed
consent by the biobank or researcher might be required. As a
note, the proposed changes to the Common Rule put forth in
the ANPRM seem to run counter to this line of argumentation,
as it provides lesser protections for the rights of the human
source in situations in which the biospecimen is obtained
outside of the research context and without any consent.181
One of the most significant cases in recent years to address
the rights and duties that arise in the research context is
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, which involved a research
program to evaluate the effectiveness of varying degrees of lead
paint abatement in residential dwellings.182 The researchers
arranged for the study homes to be rented to families with
children, most or all of whom were of lower economic standing,
with the intention that the children would reside in the homes
over a period of at least two years in order for the researchers
to be able to test the children’s blood periodically for lead
contamination.183 The same researchers had found in a prior
study that the abatement methods in question created lead
dust that remained in the house over time and was

180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 1071.
See ANPRM, supra note 20, at 44,515.
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 811–12 (Md. 2001).
Id. at 822–23.

006 FATEHI HALL_PROOF - SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

7/5/2012 1:16 PM

2012] ENFORCING THE RIGHTS OF HUMAN SOURCES

625

“particularly hazardous for children because hand-to-mouth
activity is recognized as a major route of entry of lead into the
body and because absorption of lead is inversely related to
particule size.”184 According to the court, “[i]t was anticipated
that the children, who were the human subjects in the
program, would, or at least might, accumulate lead in their
blood from the dust, thus helping the researchers to determine
the extent to which the various partial abatement methods
worked.”185 The informed consent agreement signed by the
children’s parents, however, did not explain that the research
study would assess the success of the abatement methods by
measuring the level of lead contamination in the children’s
blood.186 Noting that neither the researchers nor the IRB that
approved the research “saw [anything] wrong with the research
protocols that anticipated the possible accumulation of lead in
the blood of otherwise healthy children as a result of the
experiment,” the Maryland Court of Appeals looked to a wide
range of authorities on ethical human subjects research
standards, including international codes, treatises, and
academic writings, to determine “the duties, if any, arising out
of the use of children as subjects of research.”187 The court
stated first that, regardless of how informed the consent,
parents have no right to enlist their children in potentially
hazardous nontherapeutic research.188 The court further stated
that:
The research relationship proffered to the parents of the children the
researchers wanted to use as measuring tools, should never have been
presented in a nontherapeutic context in the first instance. Nothing
about the research was designed for treatment of the subject children.
They were presumed to be healthy at the commencement of the
project. As to them, the research was clearly nontherapeutic in
nature. The experiment was simply a “for the greater good” project.
The specific children’s health was put at risk, in order to develop lowcost abatement measures that would help all children, the landlords,
and the general public as well.189

The court held that “special relationships, out of which
duties arise, the breach of which can constitute negligence, can
184. Id. at 812 (citing Mark R. Farfel & J. Julian Chisolm, Jr., Health and
Environmental Outcomes of Traditional and Modified Practices for Abatement
of Residential Lead-Based Paint, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1240, 1243 (1990)).
185. Id. at 812–13.
186. Id. at 849.
187. Id. at 813–14.
188. Id. at 814–15.
189. Id. at 815–16.
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result from the relationships between researcher and research
subjects” based on the facts and circumstances of the particular
scenario in question, even in the absence of federal or state
statutes recognizing such a relationship.190 The court further
stated that:
A special relationship giving rise to duties, the breach of which might
constitute negligence, might also arise because, generally, the
investigators are in a better position to anticipate, discover, and
understand the potential risks to the health of their subjects. . . . This
duty requires the protection of the research subjects from
unreasonable harm and requires the researcher to completely and
promptly inform the subjects of potential hazards existing from time
to time because of the profound trust that participants place in
investigators, institutions, and the research enterprise as a whole to
protect them from harm. “Faced with seemingly knowledgeable and
prestigious investigators engaged in a noble pursuit, participants may
simply assume that research is socially important or of benefit to
them individually; they may not be aware that participation could be
harmful to their interests.”191

Quite significantly, the court also stated that:
Researchers cannot ever be permitted to completely immunize
themselves by reliance on consents, especially when the information
furnished to the subject, or the party consenting, is incomplete in a
material respect. A researcher’s duty is not created by, or
extinguished by, the consent of a research subject or by IRB approval.
. . . Such legal duties, and legal protections, might additionally be
warranted because of the likely conflict of interest between the goal of
the research experimenter and the health of the human subject,
especially, but not exclusively, when such research is commercialized.
There is always a potential substantial conflict of interest on the part
of researchers as between them and the human subjects used in their
research. If participants the study withdraw from the research study
prior to its completion, then the results of the study could be rendered
meaningless. There is thus an inherent reason for not conveying
information to subjects as it arises, that might cause the subjects to
leave the research project. That conflict dictates a stronger reason for
full and continuous disclosure.192

The Grimes case is significant for the issue of IF
disclosures from secondary research for several reasons. First,
it demonstrates the ability and willingness of state courts to
attach duties to researchers, including and beyond the duty of
informed consent, which are far more stringent than those

190. Id. at 846.
191. Id. at 851 (citing NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, ETHICAL AND
POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 2–3 (2001)).
192. Id. at 850–51.
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required under federal human subjects protection laws
including the Common Rule.193 It also sets forth the conflict
between the interest of the researcher in the research (and his
career) and the interests of the human source.194 Critically, it
shows that issues of consent and inappropriate research are,
unfortunately, alive and well today.195 The court was clearly
distressed by what it perceived as a lack of concern by the
researchers and IRB for the interests of the research
subjects.196 Furthermore, it shows that state courts may derive
and define the duties owed by the researcher to the human
subject not just from the relationship created by, and terms of,
the informed consent agreement, but from the privileged ability
of researchers to “anticipate, discover, and understand” their
subjects’ potential health risks.197
This ability to anticipate is closely related to another duty,
the duty to warn, recognized in an earlier case, Blaz v. Michael
Reese Hospital Foundation.198 The plaintiff in the Blaz case had
received x-ray therapy as a child and was notified fifteen years
later by the hospital that treated him that he was at a higher
risk of developing thyroid tumors as a result of the x-ray
therapy, and that the hospital would provide him with followup evaluation and treatment at his own expense.199 The
plaintiff refused the hospital’s offer for follow-up care.200
Meanwhile, the hospital established a “Thyroid Follow-Up
Project,” under the direction of Dr. Schneider, to study the
effects of the x-ray therapy in question.201 Dr. Schneider
submitted to the NIH a research protocol based on the Project’s
finding of “strong evidence” connecting the x-ray therapy to the
development of several types of tumors including neural
tumors.202 Subsequently, the plaintiff was sent a questionnaire
accompanied by a letter stating that the questionnaire’s
purpose was to “investigate the long term health implications”

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
1999).
199.
200.
201.
202.

See id. at 846.
Id. at 851.
See id. at 811.
See id. at 852–55.
Id. at 851.
Blaz v. Michael Reese Hosp. Found., 74 F. Supp. 2d 803, 805 (N.D. Ill.
Id. at 804.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and “associated risks” of the childhood x-ray therapy the
plaintiff had received.203 The letter did not disclose, however,
the “strong evidence” linking the x-ray therapy to tumor
development.204 After being diagnosed with neural tumors, the
plaintiff sued both the hospital and Dr. Schneider, alleging that
“they failed to notify and warn him of their findings that he
might be at greater risk of neural tumors in a way that might
have permitted their earlier detection and removal or other
treatment.”205 Dr. Schneider argued that he had no duty to
warn because he had never treated the plaintiff as a physician
treats a patient.206 In reaching a decision for the plaintiff, the
court used the general criteria established by the Illinois
Supreme Court for determining the existence of a legal duty:
“(1) whether the harm reasonably was foreseeable, . . . (2) the
likelihood of injury, (3) the magnitude of the burden of
guarding against it, and (4) the consequences of placing that
burden upon the defendant.”207
The court further stated that “[a] duty to warn exists when
there is ‘unequal knowledge and the defendant, possessed of
such knowledge, knows or should know that harm might occur
if no warning is given.’”208 The court held that “[a] reasonable
physician, indeed any reasonable person, could foresee that if
someone were warned of ‘strong evidence’ of a connection
between treatments to which he had been subjected and
tumors, he would probably seek diagnosis or treatment and
perhaps avoid these tumors, and if he were not warned he
probably would not seek diagnosis or treatment, increasing the
likelihood that he would suffer from such tumors.”209 The court
further stated that, even if the risk of injury were small,
“placing the burden on the defendant rather than the plaintiff
is the only decision that makes sense, since Dr. Schneider was
in a special position to acquire the information and had in fact
done so, while Mr. Blaz was in no position to find out.”210 The

203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 806.
207. Id. at 805. (internal quotation omitted).
208. Id. (citing Kokoyachuk v. Aeroquip Corp., 526 N.E.2d 607, 610 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988)).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 805–06.
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recognition of duties arising from the ability of researchers to
foresee or identify information of health significance to
research participants is a factor that is especially significant in
the context of secondary research on archived specimens and
DNA information because the very purpose of such secondary
research is often to establish the link between particular
conditions and the traits thought to be associated with those
conditions. Thus, a researcher that obtains specimens from a
biobank to conduct a partial or whole genome study can
anticipate the possibility of an incidental discovery of health
significance to the human source, including the incidental
discovery of a condition for which there is no routine clinical
screening.211
A second reason for the significance of the Grimes decision
is that it shows that state courts may regard the intentions of
researchers with suspicion if they surmise that the withholding
of information or consent is a ruse to avoid obligations on the
researchers or to ensure that participants enroll or do not
withdraw from a study.212 As a related matter, Grimes shows
that state courts may prioritize the welfare and interests of
individuals above the scientific and societal benefits of
research.213 Again, this is especially salient in the context of
secondary research on stored specimens and DNA information
because the very position of many in the research community,
including the opinions informing the recent ANPRM, has been
that the immense benefits of genetic research outweigh the
“minimal risks” to human sources of genetic material and
information.214
Furthermore, as some have suggested, part of the rationale
for not requiring informed consent and for not returning
research results and IFs to human sources of genetic material
and information is the concern that not enough people will opt
to participate in genetic research.215 This sentiment underpins
the decision of the court in Greenberg to not extend the duty of
informed consent to include disclosure of the researchers’
economic interest under the rationale that such a duty “would
chill medical research as it would mandate that researchers
211.
212.
2001).
213.
214.
215.

See Wolf et al., supra note 45, at 223.
See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 811–12 (Md.
See id. at 815–16, 837.
See ANPRM, supra note 20, at 44,516–17.
See Hansson, supra note 128.
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constantly evaluate whether a disclosable event has occurred
[and] would give rise to a type of dead-hand control that
research subjects could hold because they would be able to
dictate how medical research progresses.”216 The Blaz court
also addressed this concern, but reached a different conclusion
than the Greenberg court, stating:
The only policy concern I can see here is that it might be thought to
inhibit research into the effects of medical treatment if nontreating
physicians in charge of such research programs are held to have a
duty to warn the former patients of risks discovered in that research.
But this does not strike me as a real worry. First, the duty would be
discharged by a mere warning which, as explained, would here have
been neither costly nor burdensome to give. The more costly and
burdensome the warning would be to give, of course, the less likely
there would be a finding of duty. Second, the medical researchers’
legitimate desire for professional prestige and honor due to new
discoveries would counteract any such inhibition; as of course would
the concern for the well-being of its former patients which any selfrespecting hospital would have.217

Against this rather nebulous and unsubstantial worry I
must balance the fact that a finding of no duty would allow
physicians in charge of hospital research programs into the
risks of treatment policies to exploit the results of that research
for their professional advancement and curiosity without
warning the patients of any risks connected with those
treatments which their research discovered, however little the
cost of warning. I can see no social benefit in creating such a
perverse incentive structure, particularly in view of the costs to
the patients and society of preventable tumors and other
illnesses. Preventative care is not an overriding good, but it is a
considerable one.218
Thus, our hypothetical Plaintiff may have claims against
the defendant physician, hospital, researchers, and institution
for failing to obtain proper consent, for failing to disclose
possible physician and researcher conflicts, and for failing to
disclose important medical information to Plaintiff. As
articulated in the previous section, Plaintiff may also have a
claim against each defendant for failing to ensure the transfer
of his own duties to those subsequently taking custody of
216. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1070–71 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
217. Blaz v. Michael Reese Hosp. Found., 74 F. Supp. 2d 803, 807 (N.D. Ill.
1999) (internal footnotes omitted).
218. Id.
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Plaintiff’s biospecimen, as well as for failing to satisfy the
duties of the person who had custody of the biospecimen before
him.
ii. Property Law
The existence and limits of property rights to human
biological specimens and genetic information is an unsettled
but central matter to legal issues pertaining to the collection,
use, and disclosure/transfer of these specimens and
information. Under principles of property law, courts can
award both injunctive and compensatory relief, as well as
punitive damages to plaintiffs whose interests have been
violated. There are currently no states that explicitly recognize
an individual’s ownership rights to his biological specimens,
but at least two states, Georgia and Colorado, do have statutes
that recognize individual ownership of genetic information.219
The extent to which this ownership of genetic information is
tantamount to a personal property right, however, is dubious
since both Georgia and Colorado also permit such genetic
information to be used for research without informed consent
when the information is not individually identifiable.220
Furthermore, the extent to which statutory silence on
ownership of biological specimens and genetic information
indicates whether such rights exist or do not exist is yet to be
determined definitively.
Many commentators have been quick to write off issues of
property law as they pertain to research on human biological
specimens and genetic information in light of three seminal
judicial decisions—Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital, and
Washington University v. Catalona—all of which are often cited

219. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (West 2011) (“Genetic
information is the unique property of the individual to whom the information
pertains.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1) (West 2011) (“Genetic information is
the unique property of the individual tested”).
220. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(5) (“Notwithstanding [provisions
requiring informed consent], any research facility may use the information
derived from genetic testing for scientific research purposes so long as the
identity of any individual to whom the information pertains is not disclosed to
any third party . . . .”); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-6 (“Notwithstanding [provisions
requiring informed consent], any research facility may conduct genetic testing
and may use the information derived from genetic testing for scientific
research purposes so long as the identity of any individual tested is not
disclosed to any third party . . . .”).
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as holding that individuals do not have property rights to their
biological materials and genetic information once those
materials have been legally obtained by another.221 Strict
application of the reasoning used in these cases does not
support the conclusion that individuals have no property rights
to their biological materials and genetic information.222 Rather,
these cases hold that either the type of property interests
claimed by the plaintiffs or the facts of the specific case did not
support the particular property interest or causes of action that
the plaintiffs asserted.223 Furthermore, each of these cases
speaks only to a subset of the property law issues arising under
the biobank research system. Indeed, questions of property
rights in the context of the biobank research system and its
permissible activities under federal law are broad and include:
• What ownership rights, if any, do human sources have to
exclude another from possession or use of their biological
materials and genetic information in the first place?
• What property rights, if any, do human sources have to set
conditions and limits on the possession or use of their biological
materials and genetic information by another?
• What property rights, if any, do physicians and researchers have
to the biological materials or genetic information of a human
source?
What
property rights, if any, does the human source retain to the
•
biological materials or genetic information?
• What property rights, if any, do researchers have to the results of
research conducted on the biological materials or genetic
information of a human source? What property rights, if any,
does the human source have to those research results?
• What effect does the deidentification of biological materials or
genetic information have on these various property rights, if they
exist?
In this section, we will first review the facts and holdings
of Moore, Greenberg, and Catalona, and then discuss what
bearing these decisions have on the questions posed above.
The Moore case involved a patient plaintiff, George Moore,
who signed an informed consent to have his spleen removed
221. E.g., Lori Andrews, Who Owns Your Body? A Patient’s Perspective on
Washington University v. Catalona, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 398, 400 (2006).
222. Id.
223. Id.
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and various biological materials excised as part of his medical
treatment for hairy cell leukemia.224 The informed consent
stated that the hospital could “dispose of any severed tissue or
member by cremation.”225 Unbeknownst to Moore, the
physician providing his treatment subsequently used his
biological materials for research purposes and patented a
lucrative cell line based on Moore’s cells.226 Moore sued the
physician and his hospital claiming conversion of personal
property, breach of duty to obtain informed consent, and breach
of fiduciary duty for using the biological material without his
consent.227 The property right being asserted by Moore was the
right to profit from a subsequent use of his biospecimens.228
The court rejected Moore’s claim of conversion and held that
Moore’s property interest in his cells, if he ever had any, were
extinguished once the cells were legally removed from his
body.229 In rejecting the conversion claim, the court relied on (1)
the fact that no other reported judicial decision supported the
conclusion that such a continuing property interest in excised
human materials exists, (2) that California’s statutory law
placed significant limits on the continuing interest of patients
in their excised materials, (3) that Moore’s cells were “no more
unique to Moore than the number of vertebrae in the spine or
the chemical formula of hemoglobin,” and (4) that any property
interests necessary to protect Moore’s privacy and dignity are
unnecessary due to the protections provided by the informed
consent agreement that Moore signed.230
In Greenberg, the plaintiffs sued on behalf of their children
who had donated blood and tissue specimens to a researcher,
not for any therapeutic purpose, but specifically for the
researcher’s work on identifying the genetic causes of Canavan
disease.231 When the researcher developed and patented a
prenatal genetic test for Canavan disease and began obtaining
royalties whenever the test was used, the plaintiffs sued
224. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990).
225. Rohn K. Robbins, Vail Daily column: Do you own your DNA?, VAIL
DAILY
(Feb.
22,
2011),
http://www.vaildaily.com/article/20110222/
BIZ/110229956.
226. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481–82.
227. Id. at 480–85.
228. Id. at 487.
229. Id. at 493.
230. Id. at 488–93.
231. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1067–68 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
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claiming that their consent to the use of the biological
materials was based on an understanding that the materials
would only be used for identifying the genetic cause of the
disease, that the research would remain in the public domain to
promote additional research on the diseases, and that any tests
developed pursuant to the research would be broadly accessible
and priced affordably.232 Among their claims, the plaintiffs’
alleged that they had a property interest in their biological
specimens and genetic information and that the defendants
engaged in conversion by using the specimens and genetic
information “for the hospitals’ ‘exclusive economic benefit.’”233
To support their claim of a property interest in the specimens
and genetic information, the plaintiffs cited Florida’s genetic
testing statute which provides that “persons who contribute
body tissue for researchers to use in genetic analysis do not
relinquish ownership of the results of the analysis.”234 Again,
the plaintiff was asserting a right to the financial proceeds or
benefits from the use of the biospecimens.235 In rejecting the
plaintiffs’ conversion claim, the Greenberg court characterized
the transfer of the specimens and genetic information as
“donations to research without any contemporaneous
expectations of return [to the donor].”236 The court further held
that even if Florida’s genetic testing statute “create[s] a
property right in genetic material donated for medical research
purposes, it is unclear whether this confers a property right for
conversion, a common law cause of action.”237 The court’s
language supports the view that property rights in
biospecimens or genetic material may exist in another scope.238
The court reasoning in this case was that the state statute only
provided penalties for unauthorized disclosure of genetic
information or lack of informed consent to genetic testing and,
as such, only conferred property rights to the extent necessary
to serve those interests.239 Interestingly, on these grounds, the
Plaintiff in our hypothetical (or a plaintiff in a case of
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1075 (citing FLA. STAT. § 760.40 (2011)).
Id.
Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1075.
See id.
Id.
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unconsented transfer and research using biospecimens of the
type arguably permitted under the ANPRM) might have a
property claim under this statute in Greenberg.
The Catalona case involved Dr. Catalona, a physician and
researcher, who, in the course of his employment at
Washington University, collected biological samples removed
during surgery for subsequent research on the genetic causes of
prostate cancer.240 These samples along with others collected by
his colleagues were stored in the University’s biorepository for
prostate cancer research.241 The individual sources of the
biological samples were invited to participate in the genetic
research studies and were required to sign informed consent
forms indicating that the collection of samples was for medical
research and not for clinical care, that the biological samples
“may be used for research with our collaborators at
[Washington University], other institutions, or companies,” and
that the participant “agree[s] to waive any claim [he] might
have to the body tissues that [he] donate[s]” and also “waive[s]
the right to any new material or process developed through
research involving [his] tissues.”242 The consent forms also
stated that “participation is voluntary and [the participant]
may choose not to participate in this research study or
withdraw [his] consent at any time.”243 Some, but not all,
consent forms stated that participants deciding to withdraw
from the research could request that their biological samples be
destroyed, but noted that research results obtained prior to the
request could not be destroyed.244 Participants were also
provided with an informational brochure indicating that their
biological samples “may be shared with other authorized
researchers doing research in similar fields at [Washington
University] and other research centers,” and “may be used for
studies currently in progress or studies conducted 10 or 20
years from now.”245 The brochure further provided that: “You
will receive no monetary payment for your tissue nor can you
claim ownership rights to any medical or scientific product that
results from research with your tissue.”246 Over time, both Dr.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 670–72.
Id. at 671.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Catalona and other University researchers transferred
biological materials from the biorepository to other research
institutes through the use of material transfer agreements.247
In 2003, Dr. Catalona accepted a position at Northwestern
University and sent a letter requesting that they sign a
“Medical Consent & Authorization” form stating:
I have donated a tissue and/or blood sample for Dr. William J.
Catalona’s research studies. Please release all of my samples to Dr.
Catalona at Northwestern University upon his request. I have
entrusted these samples to Dr. Catalona to be used only at his
direction and with his express consent for research projects.248

Following this, Washington University “filed a declaratory
judgment action against Dr. Catalona, seeking to establish its
ownership . . . of the biological [samples].”249 Dr. Catalona
counterclaimed “that the [research participants] have the right
to direct transfer of their biological samples to him” and sought
an order prohibiting Washington University from using,
transferring, or destroying the biological samples.250 Shortly
thereafter, eight of the research participants were joined as
defendants claiming the right to direct transfer to Dr.
Catalona.251 The district court found and the court of appeals
affirmed that Washington University was the sole owner of the
biological samples to the exclusion of any property rights
asserted by Dr. Catalona or the research participants.252 Thus
Catalona decided who, among two claimants, had key property
rights.253 In reaching this decision, the court, out of necessity,
had to find that there were at least some property rights in the
biospecimens.254
While often cited as establishing that human sources have
no property rights in their biological materials and genetic
information, these three cases, both jointly and individually,
only address a subset of the property issues raised by the
biobank research system and, furthermore, suggest and in
some cases explicitly find that human sources do have some

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 672.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 676–77.
See id.
See id.
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property rights, though not the same rights as they asserted in
their claims, to their samples and information.
The issue decided in Greenberg and in Moore was whether
the plaintiffs have a proprietary right to control or share in the
fruits of research for which they voluntarily gave their
biological specimens or, put otherwise, whether they have a
property interest in the products that results from research
using their specimens. This issue is not the same as the
questions of whether (1) human sources have original property
rights in their biological materials or DNA data such that they
can exclude others from use in the first place and, if so,
whether (2) human sources retain any residual property
interests in these materials and data themselves after the first
instances of granting use to another. The first question may
seem to be addressed in Moore, as part of the plaintiff’s claim
was that no consent was obtained for the use of his cells in
research in the first place.255 However, the important and often
overlooked factor in the court’s rejection of Moore’s claim was
that Moore’s assertion of property rights was to support his
claim for conversion of property, a strict liability general intent
tort that arises from wrongful interference with one’s
ownership and possessory rights.256 In essence, the court held
that Moore had relinquished any property rights he had in his
cells because he did not intend to ever possess them again and
because they would have no value to him even if he could
regain their possession.257 This does mean, however, that a
court would not recognize a different type of property right
supporting a different tort claim or a claim arising under
contracts.
A simplistic analogy can been drawn to a situation in
which one throws away a bunch of baseball cards that the
garbage collector picks up and takes for himself. The original
owner of the baseball cards relinquished his property interest
in the cards when he knowingly placed them by the curb for
trash removal and, thus, he has no claim for conversion against
the garbage collector. However, if the garbage collector said to
the owner (or, more aptly, offered the owner a written
agreement), “I see that you have some old baseball cards that
you no longer want. I am a garbage collector, and I will take

255. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990).
256. Id. at 494.
257. See id. at 492.
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your baseball cards to the city incinerator and burn them” and
then took and used the cards for himself, the original owner
may claim that he did not relinquish his ownership interest in
the cards, but transferred possession to the garbage collector in
the form of a bailment. It may seem that such a claim is
susceptible to an argument that the original owner suffered no
injury since he clearly placed no value in the baseball cards
and, thus, suffered no loss as a result of the garbage collector
taking the cards for himself. This is not the case, however, in
the instance of biological specimens removed in the course of
clinical care. Consider, instead, that unbeknownst to the
original owner, his stack of old baseball cards included
Bowman’s 1951 classic collection worth approximately half a
million dollars. Let’s assume also that, unbeknownst to the
original owner, the garbage collector is also an established
sports memorabilia trader who had reason to know that the
owner had some potentially valuable baseball cards. If the
garbage collector then offered the owner of the baseball cards
the same (possibly written) agreement to take and burn the
cards at the city incinerator without also disclosing his status
as a sports memorabilia trader, then the original owner may
claim that he only relinquished his property interest in the
cards because he believed they would be incinerated and that,
had he known the garbage man was a sports memorabilia
trader, he would have reconsidered relinquishing his rights.
Likewise, the human source of a biospecimen may well
retain certain privacy or other rights under state and federal
law and may also anticipate some benefit in the form of
additional research and disclosure of IFs. Furthermore, the
human source may well successfully assert that he
relinquished control of the biospecimens only for purposes of
medical care and did not consent to later research or even have
any knowledge that such research might take place. A
defendant researcher may be hard-pressed to successfully
argue that the plaintiff knowingly relinquished any property
rights relating to later research when the plaintiff had no
knowledge of any such research and did not consent to such
research.
This line of analysis supports the court’s decision in Moore
to overrule the defendants’ demurrers to the causes of action
for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent,
concluding that the physician-researcher did have a duty to

006 FATEHI HALL_PROOF - SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

7/5/2012 1:16 PM

2012] ENFORCING THE RIGHTS OF HUMAN SOURCES

639

disclose his financial interest in the cells excised from Moore
and that Moore should be allowed to amend his claims for any
injuries resulting from these breaches.258 Such thinking is also
supported by some commentators who argue that agreement
between human sources of biological materials and
physicians/researchers should be regarded as a partial
entrustment agreement, where the human source entrusts his
or her biomaterial to a trusted health care provider or
researcher for specific purposes and with specific
expectations.259
There are a number of examples of potential property
rights that might exist under different state laws. First, the
cases cited above analyze state property laws. Just because one
state does not recognize a particular property right does not
conclusively establish that a different state might not, by
common law or statute, find that the very same property right
does exist. Even under these cases, there may be property
rights in how the biospecimen can be used, residual rights to
reassert control over the property, and confidentiality rights.
To the extent that there is some property right in the
biospecimen, deidentification does not and cannot eliminate
any such right, even if the right is limited to a privacy interest.
One has rights to property even if one’s name is not on it. A
mechanic grinding the VIN number off of a car does not sever
any property rights of the car owner, nor does a fotomat
blurring the face in a boudoir picture sever any property rights
of the film owner. And, at the end of the day, one must
remember that at some point in time—at least at the time of
the initial sample collection—the specimen was identified and
identifiable. Subsequent deliberative actions by a researcher or
biobank cannot unilaterally deprive the human source of
whatever property rights he might have. Allowing such a
deprivation would permit a third-party to eliminate property
rights without permission and for his own benefit.
iii. Contract Law
A contract is an agreement entered into by two or more
parties with the intention of creating legally enforceable
258. See id. at 497.
259. See, e.g., Henry S. Richardson & Mildred K. Cho, Special Article,
Secondary Researchers’ Duties to Return Incidental Findings and Individual
Research Results: A Partial-Entrustment Account, 14 GENETICS MED. 467
passim (2012).
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obligations on each party.260 Under common law principles, a
party that breaches a contract may owe the non-breaching
party, also called the party at loss, some remedy for the breach
either in the form of specific performance of the contract,
injunctive relief, or monetary damages.261 For a contract to
exist, there must be mutual assent by the parties as to the
terms of the contract (also called a “meeting of the minds”), an
intent by the parties to create a legal relationship, and an
element of consideration understood as some bargained-for
exchange of value or forbearance of a legal right that serves as
inducement for mutual performance of the contract.262
Furthermore, for a contract to be legally enforceable, all parties
must have capacity to enter the contract, the purpose and the
form of the contract must be legal, and the parties must
consent to the contract.263 Thus, a contract may be void or
voidable264 if it is the product of coercion, undue influence,
duress, failure to disclose material information, fraud or
misrepresentation in the inducement, or a lack of capacity to
contract.265
Furthermore, third parties who receive the benefit of a
contract may have obligations to one or more of the original
parties to a contract under the common law doctrine of privity
or under third-party beneficiary principles established under
statutory and case law.266
The issue of whether and to what extent informed consent
agreements memorialize a contractual relationship is of
paramount importance to the rights and obligations of human
sources and biobank research entities, as well as to the
potential remedies available to human sources claiming the
absence or the breach of informed consent. If an informed
consent agreement is viewed as demonstrative of a contractual
260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
261. Id. at § 345.
262. Id. at § 17(1).
263. Id. at §12.
264. Voidness refers to whether a contract ever came into existence
typically because of a party’s lack of intent to form the contract. Voidability
refers to whether a contract can be set aside due the assertion of an
affirmative defense by which a party can avoid his obligations under the
contract.
265. RESTATEMENT, at § 163, 174–77.
266. 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37:1 (4th ed.).
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relationship between a researcher and a human source, then a
breach of that contract by the researcher in the form of
unconsented use, transfer, disclosure, or deidentification of the
human source’s biospecimen or DNA data can be regarded as
an injury for which the human source is entitled to a remedy.
In many respects, informed consent documents arising in
the context of research are contracts in that they are
enforceable only when there is intent and mutual assent by
both parties and are voidable if there is coercion, duress,
misrepresentation, withholding of material facts, or the like.267
Indeed, researchers and research subjects, as well as courts
adjudicating disputes between these two parties, typically look
first to the language of consent documents to determine the
terms of the research subject’s participant in the research and
the extent and limits of the researcher’s allowable activities
under the agreement.268 However, the relationship created by
an informed consent agreement and the rights and obligations
of parties subject to such an agreement differ from those
arising under conventional contract law in two important ways.
First, while contracts often serve as the genesis for a
legally enforceable relationship between two parties, informed
consent documents are not necessary to establish a legal
relationship between researchers and research subjects. As
previously described, courts may recognize the existence of a
researcher-research
subject
relationship
with
legally
enforceable rights and duties as arising from a tort-based duty
of care.269 Furthermore, where informed consent documents do
exist, some state court decisions have used these documents to
find legally enforceable arrangements other than those

267. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2011) (“[N]o investigator may involve a human
being as a subject in research . . . unless the investigator has obtained the
legally effective informed consent of the subject or the subject’s legally
authorized representative. An investigator shall seek such consent only under
circumstances that provide the prospective subject or the representative
sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to participate and that
minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence. The information that
is given to the subject or the representative shall be in language
understandable to the subject or the representative.”); see also Grimes v.
Kennedy Krieger Institute, 782 A. 2d 807, 844 (Md. Court of App. 2001)
(stating that informed consent agreements can create a contract and that
research subjects are “entitled to all material information” prior to entering
the agreement) (emphasis in original).
268. See, e.g., Grimes 782 A. 2d at 824–25.
269. See supra notes 205–06, 222–25, and accompanying text.
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requiring a contract.270
Second, informed consent affords far broader protections to
human subjects than would exist under common law notions of
contracts.271 These broader protections are, in one part, due to
dignitary concerns for research subjects and, in another part,
due to the recognition of the significant imbalance in
knowledge and bargaining power that exists between
researchers and researcher subjects.272 As such, the law does
not allow a research subject to agree to unreasonable or
unnecessary risks, no matter how informed the consent.273
Informed consent documents must also include far greater
disclosures than would be required under contract law,
including, for example, disclosures about the purpose of the
research study and disclosures of alternative procedures and
treatments that may be beneficial for the research subject.274
Furthermore, while a party who breaches a contract may be
liable for damages or specific performance, informed consent
agreements must include a statement that the research subject
may discontinue participation in the research at any time and
without any penalty or loss of benefits to which he is
entitled.275 Finally, unlike contracts, informed consent

270. See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding
that an informed consent agreement created a bailor-bailee relationship that,
under Virginia state law, did not require a formal contract or actual meeting
of the minds).
271. Here we are considering federal laws governing informed consent as
providing the baseline for protections afforded to human research subjects.
The Common Rule and FDA rules governing informed consent both provide
that “the informed consent requirements in [these policies] are not intended to
preempt any applicable federal, state, or local laws which require additional
information to be disclosed in order for informed consent to be legally
effective.” 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(d) (2012).
272. Press Release, Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics, Berman
Institute Scholar Calls for a New Legal, Ethical Framework for Research with
Human
Tissue
Specimens
(June
18,
2010),
http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/web/module/press/pressid/230/interior.asp
(“‘Informed consent was not conceptualized as a contract between two
individuals with equal bargaining power,’ says Javitt, who has closely
examined some of the best-known court cases involving the rights and
expectations of human tissue contributors. ‘Rather, informed consent is an
ethical duty that the researcher owes the human subject under conditions that
historically have involved unequal power.’”)
273. Grimes 782 A. 2d at 815.
274. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2012).
275. Id.
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agreements may not include any exculpatory language that
releases the researcher from liability for negligence or that
waives any of the research subject’s legal rights.276
Some commentators have argued that informed consent
agreements, especially in the context of non-therapeutic human
tissue and genetic research, are also different from contracts
because the human source of these tissues and genetic data
receive no specific benefit from the exchange and, as such,
there is no consideration to support the creation of a
contract.277 This is again an instance where different state
courts may reach different outcomes. A plaintiff human subject
may well be able to argue that the potential improvement to
medical knowledge and clinical care resulting from the
research on the biospecimen or data is a sufficient benefit to
the human source or that the restrictions placed on the
researcher by the informed consent agreement constitute a
sufficient legal detriment to the researcher sufficient to satisfy
the requisite need for consideration.
As such, informed consent documents can be regarded as
contracts subject to multiple regulatory interactions or as
quasi-contracts. Just because an informed consent agreement
satisfies the regulatory requirements for informed consent does
not mean that a state court could not or would not also use that
agreement as the basis for resolving a contractual dispute as to
what can or cannot be done with a human source’s biospecimen
or genetic data covered by that agreement.
A case-and-point example of this comes from the York v.
Jones case decided in 1989 by the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia.278 Plaintiffs Steven and Risa York sought
the release and transfer of their frozen pre-zygote from the
defendant Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine to another
institution.279 The plaintiffs had signed a Cryopreservation
Agreement with the Jones Institute that contained all the
necessary components for informed consent under federal and
state regulations (and which had been approved by an IRB as
such) and which also contained language stating that, should
the plaintiffs no longer wish to use their frozen pre-zygotes for

276. Id; see also Grimes at 850 (holding “Researchers cannot ever be
permitted to completely immunize themselves by reliance on consents . . . .”).
277. See, e.g., Ram, supra note 7, at 163–64.
278. York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
279. Id. at 422.
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initiating pregnancy, the plaintiffs could choose one of three
options for what to do with their remaining frozen pre-zygotes:
donate them to another infertile couple, donate them for
research, or have them thawed but not allowed to develop (i.e.,
have them destroyed).280 The defendant refused the plaintiffs’
request to transfer the frozen pre-zygotes to another institution
on the grounds that the Cryopreservation Agreement limited
the plaintiffs’ control over the frozen pre-zygotes to only the
three enumerated options set forth in the agreement.281 The
defendants further argued that, because the Cryopreservation
Agreement incorporated the informed consent agreement,
inter-institutional transfer could not be allowed because it had
not been included as one of the options assessed and approved
by the IRB.282 In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and quasi-contract, the
district court held that the terms of Cryopreservation
Agreement associated with statutory requirements for
informed consent “do not conflict with any other terms of the
Agreement” and that “the failure of the [IRB] to consider the
ramifications
of
the
inter-institutional
transfer
of
cryopreserved human pre-zygotes does not vitiate the contract
between these parties nor does it usurp this Court’s jurisdiction
to settle a contractual dispute between these parties.”283 The
court further held that “the Cryopreservation Agreement
should be more strictly construed against the defendants, the
parties who drafted the Agreement.”284
There are several relevant fact patterns that arise here to
demonstrate how state courts may handle issues of informed
consent in biobank research using principles of contract law.
The first fact pattern involves the collection, use, disclosure, or
transfer of a biospecimen or data when there is a refusal to
consent to some or any of these activities. A human source’s
explicit rejection of some or any of these activities (for example,
through a refusal to sign a consent agreement or through the
use of an opt-out clause) would most certainly require honoring,
under both principles of contract law285 and informed consent.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. at 424–25.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 425–26.
Id. at 426.
Id.
Under contract law, such an explicit rejection may be regarded as the
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It is more difficult to see how deidentification would get around
such an explicit rejection.
The second related fact pattern is one involving the
collection, use, disclosure, or transfer of a biospecimen or data
when there is no informed consent at all,286 a practice that has
been interpreted by some as permissible under the current
Common Rule and which seems to be more greatly encouraged
under the proposed changes in the ANPRM. One can easily see
a state court holding that a party provided with no consent or
insufficient consent deserves at least as many rights and at
least as much protection as a party afforded the opportunity to
reject consent, especially given the York court’s analysis that
an informed consent agreement should be more strictly
construed against the party who drafted it.
The third fact pattern is one where valid consent for use,
disclosure, or transfer is granted for some specific purpose but
is silent as to other potential uses. If that consent is later
withdrawn, it is easy to see how a state court might decide that
a biospecimen that can no longer be used for the research
purpose stated in the informed consent agreement can also not
be used for a different purpose that is not mentioned in the
informed consent agreement. Again, deidentification remains a
dubious argument for reaching a different outcome.
Furthermore, if there is evidence to suggest that researcher
obtaining the consent knew that the biospecimen would be used
for another purpose than that disclosed in the informed consent
agreement, then a plaintiff human source may have a claim
that the informed consent should be voidable as a product of
misrepresentation to induce entry into the agreement.
A final fact pattern is one similar to that in the case of
Moore where consent to collection of a biospecimen is granted
in the context of clinical care. A plaintiff human source may
well be able to argue that any research use granted in such a
form of consent is the product of undue influence or duress,
especially if signed in the course of an emergency medical
intervention. A plaintiff may also raise claims of undue
influence or unconscionability resulting from the considerable
power imbalance that exists between a patient and a physician,
human source’s rejection of the researcher’s offer to use the source’s
biospecimen or data in research. No contract would be found to exist in such a
scenario.
286. There can be a lack of consent due to the literal absence of any consent
or due to an ineffective consent such as that in Grimes.
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especially in the course of medical care. The issue of the
validity of consent from a minor (and whether that consent
must be renewed upon the person reaching the age of majority)
raises even more complex issues.
Under notions of contract law and informed consent law,
the rights and limitations arising from informed consent should
“travel with” the biospecimen or data unless a new informed
consent agreement says otherwise. It is the obligation of the
person who first obtains informed consent to hold the
biospecimen to ensure that the terms of that informed consent
travel with the biospecimen in the event of a transfer to a
subsequent holder. The subsequent holder will then have an
obligation to comply with the original informed consent and to
ensure its passing down the line to another subsequent holder
and so on. Deidentification should not be sufficient to break any
limitations established by the original consent unless so agreed
to in that or in another consent. A subsequent holder may have
a claim against a previous holder if the subsequent holder
suffers an injury due to the failure of the previous holder to
obtain or to properly transfer informed consent.
We now return to our hypothetical Plaintiff and the
possible state law contract-based causes of action that he can
pursue. The Plaintiff could argue that his consent to allow
Hospital A and Dr. Physician to excise his tissues was limited
to the scope of his clinical care and that there was no informed
consent or insufficient informed consent to allow Hospital A or
Dr. Physician to collect or transfer his biospecimen for storage
or research use. As discussed below, this can lead to a complex
situation of multiple jurisdictions with multiple common law
and statutory systems being applied to a common set of facts.
D. ISSUES OF JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND CHOICE OF LAW
Our hypothetical situation demonstrates the range of
procedural and substantive issues that can easily arise in the
context of IFs and secondary research. Let us assume that,
having established various potential causes of action arising
under state statutory and common law, our hypothetical
Plaintiff’s attorney now begins a joint analysis of personal
jurisdiction and venue to determine which states’ laws are
relevant for each potential defendant.
Hospital A and Dr. Physician are certainly subject to
personal jurisdiction in Blue since that is the state in which

006 FATEHI HALL_PROOF - SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

7/5/2012 1:16 PM

2012] ENFORCING THE RIGHTS OF HUMAN SOURCES

647

they are located, the state in which they transact their
business, and the state in which the activities giving rise to
Plaintiff’s claim occurred.287 Because Plaintiff was a resident of
Red at the time of the activities giving rise to his potential
claim against Hospital A and Dr. Physician, Plaintiff may be
able to establish personal jurisdiction in Red if there exists a
general or specific long arm statute authorizing such exercise of
jurisdiction.288 Absent such a statutory basis, however, it is
unlikely that Plaintiff can successfully argue that Red has
general jurisdiction over Hospital A or Dr. Physician on the
basis of continuous and systematic activity289 or specific
jurisdiction on the basis of minimum contacts290 given several
recent court decisions rejecting personal jurisdiction over
hospitals on these grounds.291 Similarly, while Plaintiff is now
a resident of Purple, it is unlikely that personal jurisdiction
over Hospital A or Dr. Physician exists in this state absent a
long arm statute.
With respect to Biobank B, Plaintiff can establish personal
jurisdiction in the state of Green where Biobank B is located
287. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945).
288. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2012).
289. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
415–16 (1984) (holding that, in order for a court to exercise general in
personam jurisdiction over a party, the party must have “continuous and
systematic” contact with the forum state unless the party’s contacts with a
forum state are related to the cause of action in question).
290. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S., at 316 (holding that a court may exercise specific
in personam jurisdiction over a party if the party has sufficient minimum
contacts with the forum state such that maintain the suit there does not
“offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”).
291. See, e.g., Zavala v. El Paso County Hospital, 172 P.3d 173 (N.M. 2007).
In this case, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico affirmed a district court’s
finding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit filed by New Mexico
resident plaintiffs against two Texas doctors and a Texas hospital. The Court
rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that general and specific personal jurisdiction
existed despite a patient transfer contract between the Texas hospital and a
New Mexico hospital, a large number of New Mexico residents treated at the
Texas hospital, the Texas hospital’s status as a registered Medicaid provider
in New Mexico, and the Texas hospitals accreditation as a regional trauma
center serving the border region between Texas and New Mexico. The Court
instead relied on the defendants’ claims that the Texas hospital did not
intentionally solicit New Mexico patients. The Court concluded that subjecting
the Texas Hospital to personal jurisdiction in New Mexico would offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice because New Mexico’s
interest protecting the rights of its citizens was mitigated by the fact that the
injury took place out of state and outweighed by considerations for fairness,
efficiency, and public policy. See also Harlow v. Children’s Hospital, 432 F.3d
50 (1st Cir. 2005).
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and transacting business and where the unauthorized use of
the biospecimen took place, giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims.
Jurisdiction may also exist in Red or Purple depending on the
existence of a long arm statute. Plaintiff may also be able to
establish personal jurisdiction against Biobank B in the state of
Blue on the grounds that Biobank B had sufficient minimum
contacts with Blue as evidenced by its knowing and intentional
practice of obtaining biospecimens from a hospital in Blue and
by its purposeful availment of Blue’s informed consent laws
that governed the collection and transfer of the biospecimen in
question.292 If Plaintiff can adequately state a claim that the
injuries he suffered as a result of the undisclosed IF were in
part due to Biobank B’s failure to obtain informed consent or to
Biobank B’s unauthorized transfer of the biospecimen to
Research Institute C, then Plaintiff may also be able to argue
that Biobank B should be subject to personal jurisdiction in the
state of Yellow since Biobank B knowingly and intentionally
transferred the biospecimen to a research institution in that
state and as such could reasonably anticipate being subject to a
suit in that state pertaining to that transfer.293
Finally, with respect to Research Institute C and Dr.
Investigator, there is personal jurisdiction in the state of
Yellow and potentially in Red or Purple on the basis of the
same analysis used above. Research Institute C and, perhaps,
Dr. Investigator may also be subject to personal jurisdiction in
the state of Green where Biobank B is located because they
intentionally obtained their biospecimens from there and
availed themselves of Green state law governing informed
consent and the transfer of biomaterials.
It is likely that a suit by Plaintiff against one or several of
these potential defendants would result in a complex web of
cross claims, joinders, impleaders, and the like. As such, we
292. See United States v. Swiss American Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 623-24
(1st Cir. 2001) (“The purposeful availment inquiry . . . focuses on the
defendant’s intentionality. This prong is only satisfied when the defendant
purposefully and voluntarily directs his activities toward the forum so that he
should expect, by virtue of the benefit he receives, to be subject to the court’s
jurisdiction based on [his contacts with the forum].”).
293. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980) (explaining that a court’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction can
depend on whether “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.”).
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will not belabor the intricacies of which state’s law a court
might decide to apply. Our point, simply stated, is that each
collection site, biobank, and secondary researcher in the
biobank research system faces a veritable patchwork of state
laws under which it might be accountable. The decision to avoid
informed consent and return of IFs through deidentification
practices permissible under federal law may be expeditious and
may reduce administrative and financial burdens in the short
term—but in the longer term, such a decision may very well
prove to be far more costly and burdensome than expected.
E. STATE LAW IS NOT PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS
As we demonstrate, both federal and state law applies to
research using biospecimens, the rights and obligations of
biobanks and researchers, and the rights of human sources. An
obvious question is whether the federal system preempts state
laws (whether common law or statutes) that might provide
additional or different rights and obligations. Indeed,
researchers or research institutions that do not wish to be
subject to these various state law systems might well try to
argue that the federal system—notably the Common Rule and
FDA analog—should preempt state law requirements.
Overall, preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause in
the United States Constitution.294 Under the Supremacy
Clause, the federal government can (absent some specific
restriction such as the 21st Amendment295) establish laws or
regulations within its sphere that override state law. In the
case of research on human biospecimens and genetic data,
there can be federal control based on either the use of federal
funds to directly or indirectly support the research in
question296 or upon interstate commerce.297
Given the breadth of federal funding of research and the
breadth of the interstate commerce clause, it is hard to imagine
any significant research which could be totally outside of
federal oversight. However, just because the federal
government has the Constitutional authority to exercise
oversight or even has exercised oversight does not mean that

294. U.S. CONST. Art. VI Clause 2.
295. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
296. Note that the current Common Rule is largely based on federal
research funding.
297. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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states cannot also exercise oversight. The question of whether
these state oversight schemes can exist along with the federal
system is answer by the law surrounding preemption.
There are three general types of preemption which could
provide the result desired by these stakeholders: express
preemption, implied or field preemption, and conflict
preemption. Express preemption exists when Congress has
explicitly stated its intent that the oversight or regulatory
system it has created replaces all state or local systems.298
This requires an express statement of congressional intent to
preempt. A classic express preemption case is Riegel v.
Medtronic.299 Riegel involves a state product liability case over
an allegedly defective medical device. In 1976, Congress
enacted 21 U.S.C. § 360k which states, in relevant part:
(a) General Rule. Except as provided in subsection (b), no State or
political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect
with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement—
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this Act to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to
any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the
device under this Act.300

The Supreme Court analyzed this express preemption
provision and rules that any state law claim that was “different
from, or in addition to” a federal provision was preempted
meaning that the state action must be dismissed.301
However, there is no federal statutory equivalent to § 360k
(or other similar congressional pronouncements) in the
Common Rule or FDA analog. In fact, as previously discussed,
both the Common Rule and the FDA analog contain provisions
expressly stating that human subjects retain any rights they
have under other federal, state, or local laws and that
researchers cannot waive liability under these other laws. As
such, researchers’ arguments for express preemption would
fail.
298. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990).
299. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315 (2008).
300. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2006).
301. Id. at 327–28. The Court left open the possibility of a state action that
is “parallel” to the federal system. For example, if FDA required a specific
label on a medical device and the defendant failed to include the required
language on the label, the plaintiff’s claim (assuming proximate causation)
might well be a “parallel” claim under Riegel and permitted to continue.
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The second type of preemption is implied or field
preemption.
Courts look to see whether the federal
government has so occupied a field as to imply intent to
preempt state law.302 Courts also look to see whether the
Congressional purpose behind the federal law would be
frustrated by other state oversight systems or requirements.303
Given the historical role of the states in protecting their
citizens and in regulating the practice of medicine, health care
provider interactions with patients, and requirements for
informed consent, implied preemption would be difficult, if not
impossible to establish. As we discuss above, state legislatures
have been active in establishing state statutory systems
applicable to much of the research at issue. This further
demonstrates the well-accepted role of the states in protecting
its citizens and in regulating research within their borders.
The Supreme Court recently refused in Wyeth v. Levine to
find implied preemption in a product liability case involving a
prescription drug and arising under Vermont state law. 304
Note that both the medical device in Riegel and the drug in
Levine are regulated federally by the FDA. However, because
(1) the express preemption provisions of § 360k apply only to
medical devices and (2) there is a historic role for states in tort
law, the Supreme Court refused to find implied or field
preemption in the case of Levine.305 And yet, the federal
oversight of drugs and medical devices is orders of magnitude
greater than is federal oversight of research. If this more
extensive regulatory system was not sufficient to establish
preemption, then the less regulated world of research will also
not be preempted.306
Finally, there is conflict preemption (also known as
impossibility preemption).
If the federal and state
requirements cannot both be satisfied, the federal requirement
prevails.307 Conflict preemption is a difficult case to establish
and requires either a literal impossibility to satisfy both federal

302. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
303. Wyeth v. Levine 555 U.S. 555, 575 (2009).
304. Id., at 580–81.
305. Id., at 565.
306. Interestingly, key physician groups such as the New England Journal
of Medicine opposed preemption in both cases. It would seem that they would
be hard pressed to argue for preemption only in a situation in which it was to
their benefit.
307. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
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and state requirements (actual conflict)308 or a demonstration
that the state law is “an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”309
Requirements which are additive or more restrictive generally
do not trigger conflict preemption. The Common Rule and FDA
analog rarely create a requirement that could conflicts so
directly with a state requirement.
When considering conflict preemption, it is critical to
understand that a state can impose substantially greater
requirements or additional requirements without triggering
conflict preemption. Just because the Common Rule does not
require a particular disclosure or permits a particular type of
research does not preempt a state requirement for more
disclosure or for limiting certain research.
As such, absent Congress intervening and enacting an
express preemption statute, researcher will be unable to
succeed with a preemption defense. It is interesting to note that
the defendants in cases such as Bearder, Grimes, and
Greenberg did not raise any meaningful preemption defenses.
Preemption offers the biobank research system little comfort if
they face state law based tort, contract, property, or other
claims.
CONCLUSION
While there is growing attention to the issue of incidental
finding disclosures from secondary research using biospecimens
and genetic data stored in biobanks, the focus of this attention
has been too narrow in several ways. First, there has been little
attention brought to the growing discordance between the
practices allowed under federal human subjects research
regulations and the very principles by which these regulations
are to protect the rights and welfare of human research
subjects—namely incentives created by the Common Rule for
researchers to deidentify biospecimens and data in order to
avoid requirements for informed consent, IRB review, and
disclosures of IFs. Second, there has been little attention paid
to the pivotal role that state laws play in determining the
rights of human subjects and the responsibilities of
308. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–143
(1963).
309. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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researchers.
In many ways, the apparent decision of some in the
research community to hang their hats on the federal law is
one of familiarity and convenience. Researchers are accustomed
to dealing with the Common Rule.
State courts and
legislatures are more complex and fragmented.
State
institutions, by nature of being presented with different and
unfamiliar issues arising from a nascent technologies and new
forms of research, have proceeded cautiously (though not
unreasonably so given the breadth of the issues) to fully digest
and decide how state statutes and common law principles
interact with the complex problems put before them. In several
instances state courts or legislatures have decided cases in
great favor of researchers and the enterprise of biomedical
research. However, a great majority of the relevant court cases
demonstrate that it is state law and not federal law that is
deciding and will continue to decide the rights and
responsibilities that arising from the collection, use, and
transfer of biospecimens and genetic data. A growing number of
states are enacting their own statutory regimes to provide
human sources of these biospecimens and data with protections
often greater than those provided under federal laws. So, too,
are we seeing a growing number of state judicial decisions, such
as the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Bearder, in which
courts are construing applicable laws favorably for plaintiff
human sources or, as in Grimes, outright calling into question
the underlying motivations of researchers and IRBs in forgoing
disclosures and informed consent.
Indeed biobank research entities are being faced with two
emerging tides—a federal tide washing away some of the
protections afforded research subjects and a state tide bringing
to shore new, often stronger, protections. The rush of
researchers to surf the first wave may very well end with
getting slammed by the second wave.

